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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the factors responsible for introducing new torts into 
the common law. The model adopted is partly based on a model proposed 
by Bernstein, an American writer. Bernstein identifies three ways to 
package new torts to make them more attractive to the common law. By 
establishing their 'antiquity', identifying them with non-tort remedies like 
property and contract and obscuring their agents new torts appear more 
'conservative'. However, it is necessary to examine other factors to explain 
the New Zealand experience. It is suggested a dynamic court is required and 
some way to justify extending the law. Further, new torts must be necessary 
or at least useful. The parties and interests at stake may also play an 
important role. There should also be some justification for establishing a 
new tort as opposed to a new sub-category of negligence. 
These factors are examined against the background of two torts that have 
been introduced into the common law, privacy and unlawful interference. 
This paper then examines how the same factors that help introduce new 
torts may explain the relative success of the privacy in comparison with 
unlawful interference. Particularly, the importance of human rights at the 
moment and necessity seem very significant. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 15,016 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
A General 
This paper discusses the factors that encourage courts to introduce new torts. 
It is not often that new torts are created.1 New torts are novel and free 
standing torts, as differentiated from a sub-category of negligence.2 The 
reasons we develop new torts may be to redress wrongs that have been 
neglected or inadequately protected, and to reinforce values. 
Several factors may be required to introduce successful new torts. They 
include certain paradoxes suggested by Bernstein: the novelty, tort and 
agency paradoxes. However, other factors may play a role such as a dynamic 
court, some basis to legitimise the extension of the common law, necessity 
(or at least the tort is useful), the parties involved and some reason making 
negligence inappropriate. These factors will be discussed against the 
background of privacy and unlawful interference with trade. 
Secondly, this paper will discuss whether and the extent these factors 
explain the different degrees of success between unlawful interference and 
privacy. New Zealand courts have been receptive to the the introduction of 
a tort of privacy. The recognition of privacy elevates to a remediable right 
the principle which underlies the various causes of action used to protect 
privacy interests. New Zealand has gone further than other 
Commonwealth countries towards establishing a separate privacy tort.3 The 
English position, for example, is that no tort of privacy exists.4 However, 
'success' has various degrees. 
Unlawful interference has been recognised but seems less appealing to 
judges. Unlawful interference will be compared and contrasted with privacy 
1 Anita Bernstein "How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes" [1997] 75 Texas Law Review 1539 [ "New Torts"]. 
2 "New Torts" above nl, 1540. 'Novel' refers to the originality of the tort, not to its newness. 
3 Todd et al The Law of Torts in Neu., Zealand (Brookers, Wellington, 1997) 978 [T}ie Law of Torts] 978. 
4 Kaye v Robertson (1990) IPR 147 [Kaye]. 
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to examine how the factors that introduced them and the nature of these 
interests themselves explain privacy's greater apparent success. It is 
appropriate at this point to explain the basis for claiming privacy has had 
greater success. 
B Privacy 's Success 
The privacy torts may not be as successful here as they were in America. 
Bernstein describes privacy as a successful tort.5 However, she neglects to 
say that privacy may no longer be 'successful' in America after the impact of 
the constitutional right to freedom of expression which has virtually 
destroyed public disclosure.6 This will be discussed later. 
There are different degrees of 'success'. Success at one of the spectrum may 
be the acknowledgement of a need for protection. Recognition by the 
judiciary is a step forward. Becoming part of legal thinking and vocabulary, 
not merely amongst the judiciary and academics, is a further degree of 
success. But winning the battle of ideas and changing a mind set so that 
there is a paradigm shift is true success. 
Privacy is described as an emerging tort.7 Yet there appears to be a view that 
privacy will eventually be incorporated into the common law through the 
impact of human rights.8 There is already some evidence of privacy's 
success. 
There is an awareness in society of privacy as something that should be 
protected. This is evidenced by the privacy actions that have been taken and 
the adoption of privacy standards in industries like the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority.9 Privacy has achieved judicial recognition and 
5 "New Torts" above nl, 1541. 
6 See Florida Star v BJF (1989) 491 US 524, 105 L Ed 2d 443 [Florida Star]. 
7 H Schwartz ''The Short Happy Life and Tragic Death of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act" (1998] NZL Rev 259, 294 ["Death of the New Zealand Bill of Rights"]. 
8 S Sedley "Private & Public: Beginning of an End" Lecture at Victoria University of 
Wellington, 27 August 1998 ["Private & Public"]. 
9 Broadcasting Standards Authority Advisory Opinion, 6 May 1996 ["BSA Advisory 
Opinion"]. 
2 
legislative recognition in statutes like the Privacy Act 1993. Privacy is taught 
at least at Victoria University and this in conjunction with numerous books 
and academic articles, helps privacy gain intellectual respectability. 
However, there is a significant body of opinion against a right to privacy. 
The Court of Appeal in Gardiner 10 relied upon the English wiretap case of 
Malone11 and disregarded New Zealand authority of common law and 
statutory recognition of a right to privacy. The court ignored criticism of 
Malone.12 By not addressing these issues the court's reasoning seems 
lacking and therefore unconvincing. The court should have at least 
acknowledged existing jurisprudence for a privacy tort. 
Unlawful interference on the other hand is not a widely known tort, 
although it has been recognised in the common law and may be found in 
tort text books. It is not taught at Victoria University. Perhaps an 
explanation for unlawful interference's lower profile is that it has become 
subsumed into the Fair Trading Act 1986. The result though is that privacy 
has achieved greater success, although it remains to be seen whether this 
eventually results in a paradigm shift . 
II THE MODEL 
This paper proposes a number of possible factors that influence the courts to 
extend the common law. These factors may also explain why some torts are 
more successful than others. This paper examines the model suggested by 
Anita Bernstein, an American writer. Bernstein considers that the 
American experience of introducing new torts can be explained on the basis 
of three paradoxes. 
While her approach is useful, her model alone does not explain the New 
Zealand experience. It is suggested that there are other factors that are key to 
1 OR v Gardiner (16 July 1997) unreported, Court of Appeal, CA 239 / 97 [ Gardiner]. 
11 Malone v Commissioner of Police (no 2) [1979] 2 All ER 620,638. 
12 "Death of the New Zealand Bill of Rights" above n7, 294. 
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the success of a new tort. Success depends on a willing court which views its 
role in society as dynamic to ensure the court keeps up with modern 
expectations to adequately protect its citizens. 
Further, the area of law must appear suitable for judicial intervention. A 
recognised need in society will be required where the existing common law 
actions prove or seem inadequate. A deserving plaintiff and/ or 
reprehensible defendant may help the tort achieve success. This may be 
understandable, but it is questioned the extent that this factor should 
influence the courts. Instead courts should look at the need for protecting 
the wider community. 
Even if the courts decide to extend the common law, the question then is 
whether it should become a sub-category of negligence or a new 
independent tort. Most new torts are intentional or strict liability according 
to Bernstein.13 In order to balance the interest with competing interests, 
intention may be required. Intention may also provide limitations that 
without which the tort would be too wide and difficult to justify. 
Alternatively, the vehicle used to introduce the new tort may impose 
restrictions on the new tort. 
A Bernstein 's Three Paradoxes for Successful New Torts 
The enemy of new torts is conservatism.14 'Conservatism' means that the 
tort should appear to conform to the traditional judicial method of 
following and building on past precedent. The tort should not appear to be 
doing anything new but to find or develop existing law. New torts should 
appear as a gradual progression. If the new tort is perceived as a departure, 
or something new and different, it will be more difficult to find acceptance 
in the common law. 
Bernstein identifies three 'paradoxes' that she considers differentiate 
successful new torts from the unsuccessful in America: novelty, tort and 
13 "New Torts" above nl, 1541. 
14 "New Torts" above nl, 1543. 
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agency.ls These paradoxes disguise the new torts with a conservative 
appearance. The question then is to what extent the introduction and 
varying successes of privacy and unlawful interference can be explained in 
New Zealand based on these paradoxes. The New Zealand experience 
appears differenl 
1 Novelty/Antiquity Paradox 
Common law judges supposedly develop principles of law on a "stepping -
stone" basis. Therefore new torts should appear to develop by analogy, 
synthesis and small increments so they seem to emerge naturally from prior 
common law rules.16 When general principles are pronounced they are 
found to be distilled from an extensive body of law by chance or by design.17 
This paradox should be called the 'antiquity paradox' as the tort is new, but it 
is portrayed as simply a restatement or development of what has been done 
in the past. The common law has claimed that identification of a right 
requires a remedy. However, the study of formation of new torts shows that 
where there is a remedy there is a right.18 Bernstein suggests successful 
creators of new torts frame them in the past.19 Even where innovation 
must be acknowledged, novelty may be denied by claiming the law is simply 
being corrected and the changes are minor.20 
The antiquity paradox is as important in our common law as it is in 
America. This can be explained by the need of the common law, as Sedley 
explained, to face the past and future.21 The common law should respond 
to developments in society but it needs some justification in order not to 
appear arbitrary or ad hoe, otherwise the system would be undermined. 
There are underlying tensions between adaptability and certainty. Precedent 
15 "NewTorts"abovenl, 1538. 
16 "New Torts" above nl, 1545. 
17 John Irvine "The Appropriation of Personality" Dale Gibson (ed) Aspects of Privacy Law: 
Essays in Honour of John M Sharp (Butterworths, Toronto, 1980) 163, 164. 
18 "New Torts" above nl, 1544. 
19 "New Torts" above nl, 1544. 
20 "New Torts" above nl, 1545. 
21"Private & Public" above n8. 
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('antiquity') can help resolve this problem. Antiquity provides a tort with 
some degree of legitimacy so it appears more of an incremental and logical 
development rather than a an arbitrary or radical departure from the law. 
2 Tort Paradox 
Bernstein considers that 'tort' is associated with expansion, unpredictability 
and redistribution of power, whereas contract and property appear to have 
tradition and continuity behind them.22 The 'tort' label should be avoided 
and contract or property be relied on to overcome conservative opposition. 
However, there may be another explanation for the use of property and 
equity to create new torts. Perhaps the aim of new tort creators is not simply 
to be conservative for judicial acceptance. The judiciary has limited tools to 
work with, they are "coerced into categories such as 'good faith' and 
'property'" .23 The courts are obliged to offer historical analyses because that 
is what the common law expects. That does not necessarily mean judges are 
unaware of the novelty of their actions. 
The courts cannot directly admit what they are doing and "call a spade a 
spade" .24 Perhaps then courts create new causes of action first and then try 
to show that their origins are consistent with the common law afterwards. 
Judges may not be more receptive to new torts because they appear 
conservative. However, a conservative appearance may make their creation 
easier to justify. 
However, 'torts' do not appear to have the same connotations in New 
Zealand, at least in regard to privacy which was clearly based on an existing 
tort. It is suggested therefore, that provided that the tort vehicle introducing 
the new tort is well established and has connotations of antiquity, the tort 
label is unproblematic. Certainly the tort label does not appear a strong 
22 "New Torts" above nl, 1547. 
23 HJ Glasbeek "Limitations on the Action of Breach of Confidence" Dale Gibson (ed) Aspects 
of PrivactJ Law: Essays in Honour of John M Sharp (Butterworths, Toronto, 1980) 217,242 
["Limitations on the Action"]. 
24 "Limitations on the Action" above n23, 242. 
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enough factor to differentiate privacy and unlawful interference. 
3 Agency Paradox 
Disclaiming or obscuring the authors or advocates of new torts is key to 
creating new torts according to Bernstein. New torts need to be portrayed as 
independent of human creation.25 Although someone is needed to 
promote the new tort for it to succeed, any active promotion needs to take 
place behind the scenes. That is the agency paradox, an agent is required but 
needs to seem unimportant. 
The agency paradox is linked to the antiquity paradox because a skilful agent 
will be able to make the new tort appear conservative by building on past 
precedent and dicta. It is not the status or notoriety of the agent that is 
important but his/her skills in presenting the tort as an incremental and 
logical development. 
B Additional Factors 
1 Role of Judges 
Another paradox exists within the common law itself. Some courts are 
more easily convinced than others of the conservativeness of a new tort. 
This suggests some courts are more willing to be convinced. Although 
unlawful interference succeeded in New Zealand and England, English 
courts refused to introduce a tort of privacy. Maybe the reason for resistance 
lies in the courts' view of their role in society. 
It has been suggested that Commonwealth courts lack the boldness to 
establish new causes of action. Judicial conservatism is justified by their 
modern constitutional role.26 They are subordinate to parliament. The 
formal role of the courts is resolving disputes and a wider role in the 
25 "New Torts" above nl, 1552. 
26 Peter Burns "Privacy and the Common Law: A Tangled Skein Unravelling?" Dale Gibson 
(ed) Aspects of PrivactJ Law: Essays in Honour of John M Sharp (Butterworths, Toronto, 1980) 
21, 23 ["Privacy and the Common Law"]. 
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governance of society is better left to the legislature.27 The common law 
path means that decisions lack certainty because fact situations will not 
always be identical to past decisions, although precedent is supposed to 
make decisions more certain. 
Glasbeek considers that courts do not really understand social needs, nor do 
they have the tools required for the creation of adequate solutions. 
Therefore, they should be discouraged from acting, the legislature is the 
more appropriate forum.28 Complex political decisions should be the 
legislature' s.29 
Crucial to an expanded judicial role is adjudication in accordance with 
current standards.30 The law must change with society. Some may doubt 
judges' qualifications in this area. Courts may be in a poor position to decide 
if the social need truly exists.31 Even if the need exists the courts are then 
faced with deciding its nature and scope. However, if the legislature dislikes 
what the courts decide it is free to overrule them. Therefore, judicial angst 
is an unconvincing reason for inaction. 
It is suggested that the better approach is for the courts to have a more 
dynamic role. There is legitimacy in ensuring that the common law 
responds to modem needs. The law should adapt to changing 
circumstances if it is going to protect and ensure society's confidence. 
The common law has inherently dynamic features that are responsible for 
new causes of action like nuisance and intentional infliction.32 The 
common law can adapt to changing conditions. New Zealand, like Canada, 
seems to have chosen a more dynamic path, at least regarding privacy. 
Although the courts still play the common law game of making decisions 
27 GHL Fridman "Unlawful Interference with Trade - Part II" [1993] 1 Tort Law Review 99, 
121 ["Interference with Trade Part ll"]. 
28 "Limitations on the Action" above n23, 218-219 
29 "Limitations on the Action" above n23, 222. 
30 Peter Robson "Problems of Judicial Study" Peter Robson & Paul Waterman (eds) Justice, 
Lord Denning and tile Constitution ( Gower Publishing, England, 1981) 45, 56. 
31 "Limitations on the Action" above n23, 220. 
32"Privacy and the Common Law" above n26, 23. 
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appear incremental. 
Although dispute resolution is the primary role of judges, in the latter 
twentieth century the lawmaking role of the judge in the Commonwealth 
has greatly expanded.33 Lawmaking is not always confined to small 
incremental changes. Lawmaking can be legitimised though if based on the 
antiquity paradox. The courts' legitimacy for acting may also come from the 
need to resolve the issue before them and from the dominant climate in 
society. Evidence of society expectations may be found in existing 
international conventions and statutes. Torts may be successful because 
they come at the right time. 
Judges have moved into social policy as a result of rights being elevated to 
constitutional status. This is a key feature of legal thinking approaching the 
new millennium.34 The importance of rights touches even countries 
without constitutional bills of rights. Sedley contends the judiciary should 
and will incorporate rights in covenants and statutes into the common 
law.35 The separation between private and public law is artificial, not only 
the state but individuals too should be required to respect rights. 
Important social issues may be dealt with by the courts because the 
legislature appears unable or unwilling to tackle them. There is validity in 
the 'justice of the common law' remedying the omissions of the legislature. 
Further, some issues may be too controversial for the legislature to deal 
with so the courts are left to decide.36 Arguably decisions are controversial 
because society is not yet ready for change. However, the court's hand may 
be forced where the need is evident and the legislature is slow in 
responding. Any arguments that the courts do not have the resources to 
deal with social policy are therefore less convincing.37 The parties before the 
court need a decision. The courts are pragmatic, even if all the consequences 
33 Beverley McLachlin 'The Role of Judges in Modern Commonwealth Society" l1994] 110 LQR 
260, 262-263 [''The Role of Judges"]. 
34 'The Role of Judges" above n33, 263. 
35 "Private & Public" above n8. 
36 'The Role ofJudges" above n33, 263. 
37 ''The Role of Judges" above n33, 264. 
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of their action are unforeseen. 
Sometimes the legislature may not wish to act, especially where a powerful 
lobbying group is against such action. The blocking power of the English 
press was a reason given for the reluctance of the English legislature to 
protect privacy.38 
2 Necessity 
If there is an expectation of protection, and existing common law remedies 
fail to provide adequate protection, the court may decide develop a new tort. 
External factors creating this necessity may be new developments in society 
that the current law does not adequately protect against. Generally there 
will be gaps in the present law justifying new remedies. Tort may fill those 
gaps to better reflect society's expectations. 
3 Importance of the Parties and Interest 
The parties before the court may encourage the creation of new torts. A 
plaintiff who is easy to identify and sympathise with may be more likely to 
succeed. The reverse is also true. A plaintiff who in some way seems 
undeserving or difficult for judges to identify with may mean the proposed 
tort is rejected. 
Defendants also play an important role. If the defendant's action appears 
reprehensible and unjustified that may help the new tort. If on the other 
hand the defendant is justified in doing what he/ she did the court may be 
unwilling to impose liability. 
However, judges should be looking beyond the parties before them to the 
good of society as a whole. If the judges are swayed by the individuals before 
them then other arguably more 'deserving' parties may miss out later. 
38 Basil Markesinis "Our Patchy Law of Privacy -Time to Do something About It" [1990] MLR 
802,806 ["Our Patchy Law of Privacy"] . Although the reasons given for inaction were the 
problems of defining privacy, the inhibition of journalism and that judges should not second 
guess the media. 
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The fact that a new tort is available to a wide range of potential plaintiffs 
may explain why certain torts, like privacy, have more appeal than others. 
If judges can identify with a particular interest that will also surely render 
them more receptive to incorporating it into the law. 
4 Justification for not Using Negligence 
Further, if new torts are going to be created then the reason why they do not 
become a sub-category of negligence should be justified. What factors 
require separate, independent torts rather than using negligence to deal with 
gaps in the common law? Negligence is a growing area of tort liability based 
on fault. There may be reasons why the fault standard is unsuitable. The 
type of interest requiring protection and the success or failure it has had 
under negligence may be important factors the courts consider before 
introducing new torts. Negligence may be too low a threshold if the harm is 
not physical. 
Intentional torts may be the result of both political and judicial 
conservatism. Intention may be required to make the torts limited enough 
to be acceptable. Emotional and economic harm are interests that the 
common law is not particularly receptive to, except where combined with 
other damage.39 
Recognised harms in tort include physical harm under negligence and harm 
to reputation under defamation. Nervous shock though emotional, still 
has strict limitations on who can recover. Intentional infliction, which also 
deals with emotional harm, requires physical harm for liability. 
The causes of action relied on to introduce these causes of action may 
explain why privacy and unlawful interference developed as independent 
torts. Although even if a higher standard for liability exists, there may come 
a time when negligence absorbs the torts. 
39 DL Zimmerman "Requiem for a Heavyweight: A FareweU to Warren and Brandeis's 
Privacy Tort'' l1983] Cornell Law Review 291, 324. 
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III THE TORTS 
A Privacy 
1 Definition 
Gavison describes privacy is a limitation of others' access to an individual 
which has three distinct but interrelated aspects, secrecy, anonymity and 
solitude.40 Secrecy involves the protection of information about a person. 
Anonymity means that there is a loss of privacy when someone pays 
attention to you. In obscurity there is privacy.41 Solitude involves physical 
access to the person. 
There are various things that Gavison does not consider part of privacy. 
Harassment, emanations from neighbouring land, abortion prohibition, 
non-interference by the State and presenting someone in a false light are not 
privacy issues.42 This essay assumes that Gavison is correct, except in 
excluding false light. 
2 Possible Torts 
Four possible privacy torts protecting different interests have been accepted 
in the United States.43 They are: 
(i) Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his/ her 
private affairs; 
(ii) Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; 
(iii) Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; 
and 
(iv) Appropriation for the defendant's advantage of the plaintiff's name 
or likeness. 
40 Ruth Gavison "Privacy and the Limits of Law" (1980) 89 Yale LJ 421,428 ["Privacy and the 
Limits of Law"]. 
41 Andrew Jay McClurg ''Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability 
for Intrusions in Public Places" (1995) 73 North Carolina Law Review 989, 1033 [ ''Bringing 
Privacy Law Out of the Closet"]. 
42 "Privacy and the Limits of Law'' above n40, 436. 
43 W Prosser ''Privacy" (1960) 48 Cal LR 383, 389 ["Privacy"]. 
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Some of these torts may find greater acceptance in New Zealand than others. 
They have met with different degrees of success in the United States. 
B Unlawful Interference 
Unlawful interference may be either an umbrella tort or a residual category 
Some consider it a genus tort.44 However, Bedggood considers that the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal indicated that unlawful interference was a residual 
tort.45 
There must be an intentional interference with the trade or economic 
interests of the plaintiff, by unlawful means, causing damage to the 
plaintiff.46 Justification may limit liability, but the issue is undecided at 
present. In New Zealand the defendant's intention must be to cause 
economic loss to the plaintiff. Further, that intention must be a cause of the 
defendant's conduct though it need not be the primary purpose.47 However, 
this factor has not gone without criticism.48 
44 Hazel Carty "Intentional Violation of Economic Interests: The Limits of Common Law 
Liability" [1988] LQR 250 ["Intentional Violation of Economic Interests"]. 
45 The Law of Tarts above n3, 712. See Van Camp Chocolates Ltd v A11lsebrooks Ltd 1 NZLR 
354, 359 [Van Camp], where they said they saw "insufficient reason for disregarding a 
judicial remedy which from time to time may be useful to prevent injustice". 
46 The Law of Torts above n3, 712. 
47 Van Camp above n45, 360. 
48"lnterference with Trade Part II" above n27, 111-113. 
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IV APPLYING BERNSTEIN'S MODEL 
A Novelty Paradox 
1 Privacy 
(a) In America 
Warren and Brandeis argued that privacy was not novel, instead the law 
had recognised privacy interests under other doctrines such as copyright, 
implied contract, breach of confidence and defamation. Development of the 
law was inevitable according to Warren and Brandeis.49 Thoughts and 
emotions required legal recognition and the common law had the capacity 
to grow to provide the necessary protection.so As Bernstein points out, 
Warren and Brandeis in their article did not want credit for novelty but 
asserted the long line of pedigree of their tort.51 
The origins of privacy go back a long way. Roman law stated to enter a 
man's house against his will, even to serve a summons, was an invasion of 
privacy.52 The common law maxim "every man's house is his castle" 
arguably recognised privacy as well. 
(b) In New Zealand 
Privacy was first introduced here in Tucker.53 The court did not expressly 
argue the ancient pedigree of privacy nor try to deny the novelty of the 
action or the tort label. Instead the court relied on intentional infliction of 
emotional distress to introduce the tort. Public disclosure was described as 
the 'natural progression' of intentional infliction. 
49 S Warren and L Brandeis 'The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 Harvard LR 193, 193-195 ["Right 
to Privacy). 
50 "Right to Privacy" above n49, 195. 
51 "New Torts" above nl, 1546. See ''The Right to Privacy"above n49, 193-95, 204-5, 207-10 
where they present common law cases implicitly recognising an intangible property right in 
personal privacy. 
52 Pavesich v New England Life Ins Co (1905) 50 SE 68, 71 [Pavesicl1]. 
53 Tucker v News Media Ow11ersl1ip [1986] 2 NZLR 716 [ Tucker]. 
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Intentional infliction dates back to 1897 in Wilkinson v Downton54 and was 
introduced here in 1922 by Stevenson v Basham.55 Jefferies J said in relation 
to intentional infliction,56 "[t]hat cause has been long recognised in the law." 
By implication privacy is not novel and appears incremental rather than 
radical.57 
It seems a natural progression of the tort of intentional infliction ... and in accordance 
with the renowned ability of the common law to provide a remedy for a wrong. 
Although, intentional infliction has been used infrequently .58 Privacy then 
seems to fit the common law model. A cause of action develops within the 
common law by extension of another. 
2 Unlawful Interference 
(a) General 
Unlawful interference can be viewed as a logical, natural progression from 
the other economic torts. It has affinities with the other economic torts, 
particularly inducing or procuring a breach of contract.59 The threads of the 
separate nominate torts have been drawn together to form one tort.60 Most 
of the nominate torts can be explained on the basis of unlawful 
interference.61 Arguably because unlawful interference builds on previous 
existing causes of action it appears more conservative. 
In Lonrho Plc v Fayed 62 Ralph Gibson LJ acknowledged unlawful 
interference could still be described as new though it was familiar when 
unlawful means used were intimidation or procuring breach or interference 
54 Wilkinson v Downton [1987] 2 QB 57 [Wilkinson]. 
55 Stevenson v Basham [1922] NZLR 225 [Stevenson]. 
56 Tucker above n53, 731. See the quote from Jefferies J' s judgment. 
57 Tucker above n53, 732. 
58 Tucker above n53, 731. See the quote from Jefferies J' s judgment. 
59 GHL Fridman "Interference with Trade or Business - Part 1" [1993] Tort Law Review 19 
["Interference with Trade Part I"]. 
60 Lyn Stevens "Interference with Economic Relations - Some Aspects of the Turmoil in the 
Intentional Torts" (1974) 12 Osgoode Hall L J 595,620 ["Interference with Economic 
Relations"]. 
6 l"Interference with Economic Relations" above n60, 622. 
62 Lo11r/10 v Fayed {1990]2 QB 479, 491-92 {Lonr/10 v Fayed]. 
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with contract. 
Some economic torts though are of comparatively recent origin.63 
Conspiracy goes back hundreds of years but has significantly changed this 
century.64 Intimidation was only established in 1964 in Rookes v Barnard.65 
Inducing or procuring a breach of contract dates back to 1853 to Lumley v 
Gye.66 Yet, it too has been altered and expanded by modern cases. 
However, unlawful interference's pedigree is more respectable than often 
thought.67 It derives partly from the Courts of Equity which would grant an 
injunction against criminal acts which destroyed or diminished the value of 
property, Springhead sets down the principle.68 Unfortunately, doubt exists 
about the validity of the origins of this tort. The authority of Springhead 
was said to be reduced in the case of Lonrho v Shell.69 It has also been 
suggested that there should be a distinction between unlawful interference 
and the equitable jurisdiction. As intention is key for the tort but may not 
be for equity.70 
There is dicta supporting liability for "he who hinders another in his trade 
or livelihood" going back to 1706.71 Stevens claims the many of the older 
cases can be explained on the basis of unlawful interference.72 Others have 
said that although only recently acknowledged there is dicta of a general 
economic tort as early as Allen v Flood 73 which was decided in 1898. Other 
cases of about the same period could also have been used to establish a tort 
63 "interference with Trade Part l" above n59, 20. 
64 "Interference with Trade Part I" above n59, 20. 
65 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 [Rookes v Barnard]. 
66 Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 E) & Bl 216; 118 ER 749 [Lumley v Gye]. 
67 "Rocking the Torts" [1983] 46 MLR 224 l"Rocking the Torts"]. 
68 "Rocking the Torts" above n67, 224. Springhead Spinning (1868) 6 Eq 551, 558-559 
[Spring head]. Spring head was approved by Gouriet v UPW [1978] AC 435. 
69 "Interference with Trade Part II" above n27, 103. In Associated British Ports v Transport 
and General Workers' Union [1989] 3 All ER 796 the authority of Springlzead was said to be 
reduced since Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Ltd [1981] 2 All ER 456. 
70 Andrew J Stewart "Civil Liability for Industrial Action: Updating the Economic Torts" 
(1984) 9 Adelaide LR" 359, 373 [ "Civil Liability for Industrial Action"]. 
71 Keeble v Hickeringill (1706) 11 East 574. See also Carrington v Taylor (1809) 11 East 571. 
72 "Interference with Economic Relations" above n60, 22. 
73 Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1 [Allen v Flood] . 
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of unlawful interference.7 4 
(b) In New Zealand 
In New Zealand authority supporting unlawful interference goes back to 
1914. In Fairbairn75 the Court of Appeal held that a trader whose business 
was injured by a trade rival by unlawful means had a right of action. The 
court relied on the House of Lords decision in Mogul76 to establish liability, 
a case based on conspiracy. Our Court of Appeal held it was clear authority 
that in competition between rivals unlawful weapons could not be used to 
advance their interests. If unlawful means were used causing injury the 
injured party had a good cause of action.77 
Mogul dates back to 1892. Again the new tort appears to have been 
developed by expanding another established tort. Unlawful interference 
appears to be a natural development. Perhaps such descriptions down play 
the reality though. 
In Coleman78 the court found the tort was recognised in a case dating back to 
1925.79 The courts used older cases to establish the new tort.80 By building 
on dicta from cases dating back to the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century novelty could be denied. Therefore unlawful interference appears 
to fit Berstein' s novelty paradox. It has roots going back a long way and dicta 
in several cases were the possible seeds of its creation. 
74 Patrick Elias and Keith Ewing "Economic Torts and Labour Law: Old Principles and New 
Liabilities" [1982] CLJ 321,335 ["Economic Torts and Labour Law"]. See also Mogul SS Co Ltd v 
McGregor, Gow & Co [1892] AC25 [Mogul); Allen v Flood above n73; Quinn v Leathern [1901] 
AC 495 [Quinn]. These are the cases setting the ground rules for the economic torts. 
75 Fairbairn, Wright & Co v Levin & Co [1914] NZLR 1 [Fairbairn]. 
76 Mogul above n74. 
77 Fairbairn above n75, 29. 
78 Coleman and Others v Myers and Others [1977] 2 NZLR225 [Coleman]. 
79 Sorrell v Smith [1925] AC 700. 
80 See Emms v Brad Lovett Ltd [1973] 1 NZLR282 where the court used Sorrell above n79 and 
also Quinn above n74, as well as relying on Torquay Hotel Co Ltd v Cousins [1%9] 2 Ch 106. 
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B Tort Paradox 
1 Privacy 
(a) In America 
Warren and Brandeis considered that intellectual property had already been 
used to protect privacy. Although the courts rested their decisions on the 
narrow grounds of property they were recognition of a more liberal 
doctrine.81 So privacy appeared to have some basis in property but had 
outgrown it. 
Warren and Brandeis also used contract and breach of confidence to support 
the new tort of privacy. The authors cited cases were these causes of action 
·had provided a measure of protection to an individual's privacy.82 But 
again they considered that those methods of protection were no longer 
sufficient.83 
Other common law vehicles may have covered the new right with 
conservatism yet Warren and Brandeis clearly promoted a tort to protect 
privacy.84 The way they presented privacy though was consistent with the 
tort and antiquity paradoxes. 
(b) In New Zealand 
Four torts were identified by Prosser. If Bernstein's model was applied to 
these privacy torts misappropriation and intrusion would be expected to be 
the most successful. However, the New Zealand experience seems to have 
produced different results. 
81 "Right to Privacy" above n49, 204. 
82 Prince Albert v Strange (1849)1 McN & G 25, Tuck v Priester (1887) 19 QBD 639 and Pollard 
v Photographic Co (1888) 40 Ch Div 345. 
83 "Right to Privacy" above n49, 210. 
84 "Right to Privacy" above n49, 211. 
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(i) Misappropriation 
Misappropriation arguably has a strong property basis. Prosser said the 
interest protected is not so much a mental one as it is proprietary in the 
exclusive use of the plaintiff's name and likeness.85 
As far back as 1867 Cairns LJ supported property in a name.86 Supporting 
dicta came from Malins VC in Springhead that a man had sufficient 
property in his own name to prevent another from falsely passing off and 
causing injury to his reputation.87 There is a strong basis for arguing that 
misappropriation emerged from property. 
Misappropriation would therefore appear to have a strong chance of success. 
Misappropriation has been recognised in Australia. In Talmax the plaintiffs 
recovered damages on the premise that the publication of Kieran Perkins' 
photo (a well known sporting hero) in promotional material without 
consent diminished the opportunity to commercially exploit his name, 
image and reputation.88 Yet it has not yet been recognised here. 
(ii) Intrusion 
Intrusion arguably also has property links because it may be seen as an 
extension of trespass. Trespass protects property. Intrusion has been 
recognised as going further than physical intrusion in America to include 
eavesdropping by wire tapping. 89 
Even if intrusion does go beyond territorial limits, it can still be analysed as 
having origins in property. There are clear links with trespass. Like the 
wider privacy interest itself advocated by Warren and Brandeis, intrusion 
arguably has simply outgrown its origins. 
85 "Privacy" above n43, 383. 
86 Maxwell v Hogg (1867) 2 CH App 307, 310. 
87 Springhead above n68. 
88 Talmax Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd I 1996] 36 IPR 46. 
89 Hamberger v Eastman (1964) 106 NH 107,206 A 2d 239. 
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It remains to be seen whether intrusion will be incorporated into New 
Zealand law. Opportunities have arisen to introduce it (where there was 
video surveillance and wire tapping) but the courts have chosen to ignore 
them.90 
(iii) False light 
False light has clear links with defamation. They share the element of a 
false association or statement being made about the plaintiff. Under both 
the plaintiff's reputation is protected. In false light though the falsity need 
not be defamatory. False light may be differentiated from defamation if it is 
limited to nondisparaging false statements that are highly offensive.91 
However, it could still be said to emerge from defamation. 
There is also an overlap with intentional infliction of emotional distress if 
false light requires intention. This may be implicit if to be actionable the 
statement must be highly offensive.92 However, basing one tort on another 
would be a disadvantage for new torts on Bernstein's model as they cannot 
avoid the tort label. 
Further, the extent the new torts overlap with existing torts might affect 
their success. False light for instance might overlap too much with 
defamation. However, there is dicta supporting the possibility of the 
introduction of false light in Bradley.93 
(iv) Public Disclosure 
Prosser considered public disclosure an extension of defamation into the 
90 Gardiner above nlO and R v Fraser (1997] 2 NZLR 442 [Fraser) seem to suggest there is no 
privacy tort where video surveillance and wire taps are used. However, there may be an 
explanation for this which will be discussed later in this paper. 
91 Gary Schwartz "Explaining and Justifying a Limited Tort of False Light Invasion of 
Privacy" (1991) 41 Case Western Res L Rev 885, 918 ["False Light'']. 
92 "False Light"above n91, 980. 
93 Bradley v Wingnut Films [1993) 1 NZLR 415,425 [Bradley]. This case does not establish 
false light but the judge suggests it is a possibility. 
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field of publications not falling within the narrow limits of the old torts.94 
The difference being the truth defence does not apply. The interest protected 
was the same as in defamation, reputation and mental distress. 
Public disclosure could also be viewed as an extension of breach of 
confidence as it deals with the disclosure of facts of a non-public nature. 
Breach of confidence may be based in contract, property or equity. The new 
tort may appear more conservative by association, despite the fact that 
breach of confidence is a tort. 
However, New Zealand has preferred to view public disclosure as an 
extension of intentional infliction. This is explainable by the fact that 
intentional infliction has a long history enabling privacy to conform to the 
antiquity paradox. It may also be easier. Jefferies J distinguished public 
disclosure from defamation as the injury was not to character or reputation, 
but to "feelings and peace of mind" .95 
Public disclosure appears to be based on another tort. Yet, New Zealand 
introduced it in Tucker. Therefore, provided a new cause of action is based 
on a well established tort, the tort label is not problematic. 
2 Unlawful Interference 
Unlawful interference is said to be an extrapolation from a dozen precedents 
and a mixture of the economic tort principles.% However, unlawful 
interference has roots in other common law vehicles. A property analysis is 
possible. 
Lord Denning in Island Records 97 adopted a wide definition of property. 
'Property' according to Lord Denning covered economic benefits expected to 
flow from unimpeded business. According to Stewart the earlier cases 
94 "Privacy" above n43, 398. 
95 Tucker above n53, 732. McGechanJ quotes Jefferies ]'s judgment. 
96 Peter Bums "fort Injury to Economic Interests - Some Facets of Legal Response" (1980) 58 Can 
Bar Rev 103, 148 [''Tort Injury to Economic Interests"]. 
97 X P Island Records [1978] 1 Ch 122,136 [Island Records]. 
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discussed in Island Records justified a broad interpretation.98 Waller J 
agreed that equity would grant an injunction where there was an injury to a 
property right.99 So Waller and Denning granted the injunction. Equity 
was also arguably part of the origins of this tort. Equity and property would 
give the tort a strong basis. 
Unlawful interference has been described as the natural progression of the 
economic torts.100 Some of the economic torts involve contract issues 
because a party threatens to breach a contract or does breach it. The tort of 
inducing or procuring a breach of contract was established in Lumley v 
Gye.101 In Rookes v Barnard 102 there was a threat to break a contract and it 
was held to be sufficient unlawful means for liability. This is what Lord 
Denning seems to have suggested in Torquay.103 Interference with contract 
rights is use of unlawful means. So there may be links with contract law. 
C Agency Paradox 
1 Privacy 
(a) In America 
Warren and Brandeis are recognised as playing a major role in the success of 
privacy. Their article was responsible for promoting privacy and has been 
cited in many cases.104 Bloustein contends that they played the role of 
learned and ardent counsel rather than detached scholars.I 05 It appears then 
that Warren and Brandeis do not fit the agency paradox.106 Yet, they were 
playing the common law game of making the tort they promoted appear to 
be emerge from a long line of previous cases so it conformed to the antiquity 
98 "Civil Liability for Industrial Action" above n70, 373. 
99J sland Records above n97, 144. 
100"Tort Injury to Economic Interests" above n96, 148. 
101 Lumley v Gye above n66. 
102 Rookes v Barnard above n65. 
103 Torquay above n80, 138. 
104 See for example Kaye above n4, 155. 
105 Edward J Blous~in "Privacy Tort and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort 
Petty and Unconstitutional As Well?" [1968) 46 Texas Law Review 611, 615. 
106 "New Torts" above nl, 1554. 
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paradox. 
Further, the tort was not entirely new or Warren and Brandeis' s invention 
alone. In De May v Roberts,1CJ7 in 1881 for example, a plaintiff was a,,varded 
damages when the defendant witnessed her giving birth. Warren and Brandeis 
did not claim any originality though, again this is what the antiquity paradox 
requires good agents should do. 
Warren and Brandeis also seemed to advocate only a tort of public disclosure. 
They intended privacy to be limited to only the most flagrant breaches and to 
be consistent with defamation.108 Thereby giving the tort a conservative 
appearance. 
Prosser certainly had a hand in privacy's acceptance. Prosser identified the 
four different privacy torts.109 He claimed to have identified the torts from 
cases decided in the United States rather than be promoting them. 110 Prosser 
has been called "the master portraiter and veiled agent of American tort 
history" .111 
He was uninterested in promoting the rights of the disenfranchised, changing 
the balance of power or identifying new victims. Therefore, his proposals were 
seen as undirected and imminent. 112 A conservative demeanour is said to have 
charmed away some of the conservative resistance.113 The fact the torts he 
advocated were not born in a 'bleeding heart' may have helped deny novelty 
and agency.114 The adoption of privacy in the Restatement of Torts also helped 
privacy achieve credibility and agency was a little less apparent.115 
107 DeMay v Roberts (1881) 9 NW 146. The court stated that were a wrong had been committed 
the court would provide a remedy. The decision was arguably about privacy. 
108 ''The Right to Privacy" above n49, 214-218. 
109 "Privacy" above n43. 
110 "Privacy" above n43, 389. "What has emerged from the decisions is no simple matter" 
111 "New Torts" above nl, 1552. 
112 "New Torts" above nl, 1553. 
113 "New Torts" above nl, 1553. 
114 "New Torts" above nl, 1553. 
115 "New Torts" above nl, 1554. See also Anita Bernstein "Restatement Redux" (1995) 48 Vand 
L Rev 1663, 1679-80. 
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(b) New Zealand 
Developments in America have had an impact here. New Zealand has looked 
to American caselaw for guidance.116 So the agency of Warren, Brandeis and 
Prosser is relevant but perhaps less obvious here. There is no mention of 
Warren and Brandeis in Tucker, however, reference is made to Prosser on 
Torts117 and American case law. Arguably New Zealand imported the 
American agents. 
Cases recognising privacy since then seem to have relied on Tucker as 
establishing the tort. The irony is that New Zealand imported a tort that has 
been practically abolished by the United States Supreme Court. Public 
disclosure no longer really exists. In balancing privacy with freedom of 
expression, privacy was limited to cases where revelations were so intimate and 
unwarranted as to outrage the community's notions of decency.118 The tort was 
further limited in Florida Star 119 to the point that it has perhaps completely 
destroyed the tort. The court held that if a newspaper lawfully obtains 
information of public interest then the publishers could not punished, unless to 
protect a state interest of the highest order.120 Protecting disclosure of a rape 
victim's name was not such an interest, although a statute existed to this effect. 
The effect of this decision according to one judge was to hit the bottom of the 
slippery slope.121 
Further, we took from America a version of that tort was not the mainstream 
view. McGechan J referred to Melvin122 and Briscoe123 in regard to public 
disclosure.124 In these cases the plaintiffs were allowed to retreat into the past. 
116 See Tucker above n53 and the "BSA Advisory Opinion" above n9. 
117 Prosser on Torts (4th ed, 1971) 809-812, see Tucker above n53, 733. 
118 Sidis v FR Publishing Corp (1940) 113 F 2d 806, 809 [ Sidis ]. 
119 Florida Star above n6. 
120 Florida Star above n6, 455. Affirming their decision in Daily Mail 443 US 103, 61 L Ed 2d 399. 
Further the American Supreme Court in Time Inc v Hill (1967) 385 US 374 made false light 
consistent with the first amendment privilege as recognised in New York Times v Sullivan (1964) 
376 us 254. 
121 Florida Star above n6, 468. As per Scalia J dissenting. 
122 Melvin v Reid (1931) 297 P 91 [Melvin]. 
123 Briscoe v Readers' Digest Associatio11 (1971) 483 P 2d 34 [ Briscoe]. 
124 T11cker above n53, 733. 
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They do not represent the general American approach. In Sidis, the court 
refused to grant protection to a man who had once been a public figure as a 
child. Once a public figure it was not possible to retreat into obscurity. 
2 Unlawful Interference 
It has been said that this tort owes its modem acceptance to Lord Denning, who 
decided to establish it. 125 He was a clever agent playing the common law game. 
His agency was not that obvious, despite the fact he built on his own dicta. 
Unlawful interference began to appear in litigation to restrain industrial action 
and be added on to other economic torts.126 
Lord Denning referred to unlawful interference in Daily Mirror .127 In Torquay12s 
he persuasively argued its existence, relying on dicta from Stratford,129 Rookes v 
Barnard and Daily Mirror. Denning does not appear to be an obvious agent 
because he backs himself up with other judicial statements. It is not who 
Denning was that is important, but the way he presented the tort when he 
introduced it that makes him a good agent. 
Denning illustrated how the principle of unlawful interference had developed 
in the past.BO In Hadmorl31 Denning mapped the genealogy of the tort.132 He 
said that Lord Reid left open whether interference without breach of contract 
was actionable in Stratford . He explained the common law would be deficient 
if it did not condemn the action in this case. 133 So he appeared to be filling a 
gap that was previously identified. 
He adopted the tort noting that it exemplified the law as he always understood 
125 "Intentional Violation of Economic interests" above 44, 263. 
126 "Intentional Violation of Economic Interests" above n44, 263. 
127 Daily Mirror Newspapm Ltd v Gardner [1968] 2 QB 762 [Daily Mirror]. 
128 Torquay above n80. 
129 JT Stratford & Son Ltd v Lindll?IJ [1965] AC 269. 
130 The principle started in Lumley v Gye, above n66, was expanded in again in Quinn above 
n74. 
131 Hadmor Productions Ltd v Hamilton [1981} ICR 960. 
132 "Intentional Violation of Economic Interests" above n44, 263. 
133 Torquay above n80, 138. 
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it to be.134 Rather than offering something novel he makes it appear to be 
aimed at achieving consistency, by explaining earlier precedent.135 The 
introduction of unlawful interference appears logical. Official recognition of 
unlawful interference came in Merkur.136 
Agency in this case arguably may be more apparent than in privacy because of 
Denning's reputation. He has been called "England's Most Revolutionary 
Judge" 137 and seen as an innovating and substantial force on the development 
of the law.138 
Denning may have had a reputation for protecting the weak from the abuse of 
the more powerful but even that was not necessarily deserved, at least 
regarding the homeless and social security claimants.139 Arguably he was less 
of a bleeding heart and more like Prosser than is often recognised. His moral 
views could be quite traditional.140 Unlawful interference is linked to 
commercial morality. If he was conservative regarding other moral views, he 
could have been perceived as conservative about business morality, therefore 
unlawful interference seemed more conservative. Further, the tort may have 
appeared more acceptable because most people would consider competition 
between businesses should be restricted to lawful means. Perhaps therefore not 
all Denning' s innovations were perceived as that novel. 
Using precedent and suggesting incremental change may have overcome 
Denning' s reputation as a judicial revolutionary in this area. His expansion has 
been described as "a conservative elaboration of extant principles" rather than a 
134 Torquay above n80, 139. 
135 "Tort injury to Economic lnterests"above n96, 143. Denning also highlighted that this was a 
separate cause of action. 
136 Merkur Island Shipping Corp v Laugliton [1983] 2 AC 570 [Merkur]. 
137 Hugo Young''England's Most Revolutionary Judge" Sunday Times, London, 17 June 1973. 
138 Ray Geary "Lord Denning and Morality" Justice, Lord Denning and tlze Constitution P Robson 
and P Watchman (eds) (Gower Publishing Co Ltd, England, 1981) 74 ["Lord Denning"]. 
139 Peter Robson and Paul Watchman "Resisting the Unprivileged" Peter Robson and Paul 
Watchman (eds) Justice, Lord Denning and tile Constitution (Gower Publishing Co Ltd, England, 
1981) 113, 123. 
140 "Lord Denning" above n138, 81. "Apart from sterilised husbands, recalcitrant women 
students and the permissive society in general, other areas that have attracted Lord Denning's 
moral ire have been pornography, artificial insemination and homosexuality." Whereas 
society's view regarding some of these issues was changing. 
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revision. 141 This illustrates his skill in using common law tools. 
Further, according to Fridman "Denning cannot be singled out as the sole 
progenitor'' .142 He was not the only one responsible for unlawful interference's 
development, older cases existed to support unlawful interference such as 
Mogul and Allen v Flood. So that may also have helped unlawful interference 
escape being perceived as 'new'. 
Denning' s influence on New Zealand courts is even weaker because Fairbairn 
recognised unlawful interference in 1914. Denning was promoting it in the 
1960s and 1970s. That does not mean Denning had no effect here though. In 
Coleman 143 in 1977, the court was referred to English authorities like Torquay. In 
Van Camp the New Zealand Court of Appeal did not just rely on New Zealand 
authority but also Merkur .144 Lord Denning' s name appears, but he is not 
alone.145 
V OTHER FACTORS FOR INTRODUCING TORTS 
A Dynamic Court 
Bernstein suggests that analogy, respected themes, existing doctrines and 
adaptation to circumstances are important to the success of new torts.146 Basing 
privacy on other causes of action may partially explain its success. However, 
even then it was quite a stretch of an existing cause of action. In New Zealand 
there was no precedent for a tort of privacy, even if it is considered an 
extension of intentional infliction. No such tort existed in England or Australia 
either. 
In Kaye the English Court of Appeal declined the opportunity to introduce 
141 "Tort Injury to Economic Interests" above n96, 155. 
142 "Interference with Trade Part 11" above n27, 102. 
143 Coleman above n78. See Torquay above n80. 
144 Merkur above n136. See Van Camp above n45. 
145 Coleman above n78, 294. See also Emms above n80, 286-87. 
146 "New Torts" above nl, 1565. 
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privacy, despite their sympathy for the plaintiff. Although intentional infliction 
was not argued, the court thought that only the legislature could introduce a 
tort of privacy because the right had so long been disregarded.147 Despite the 
fact the lack of protection was considered a failing of statutory and common 
law.148 Was privacy's introduction not then a leap rather than a step forward? 
New Zealand appears to have chosen a dynamic judicial role rather than the 
conservative English approach. 
Whereas, unlawful interference has a long history and is arguably a natural 
progression from the other economic torts. It better fits the model of the 
common law as a step by step development. It seems a smaller and more 
gradual step than privacy. 
Saying new torts that have failed to be successful are 'too radical' is just an 
explanation offered for their failure rather than the cause.149 Bernstein 
considers privacy is quite radical, as other successful torts have been. 
Radicalism has not prevented the success of privacy. That same radicalism 
may be the reason for the interest in privacy, illustrating the possibilities of the 
common law to develop with society's values. 
New Zealand courts seem to have been more willing to be convinced that it 
was the common law's role to provide a remedy. It is suggested that the 
explanation lies in the court's view of their role as more expansive. Where they 
perceived a need they were willing to act. However, the courts seem more 
enthusiastic about privacy than unlawful interference.ISO What factors make a 
court more willing to act? 
147 Kaye above n4, 155. Per Leggatt LJ. 
148 Kaye above n4, 154. Per Bingham LJ. 
149 "New Torts" above nl, 1557-1558. 
150 Compare the cases of Tucker above n53 and Van Camp above n45. The legislature had not 
acted and the court saw a need that needed to be addressed. ln Van Camp the court seems to 
suggest unlawful interference will not often be necessary. 
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1 Privacy 
Despite the fact that privacy is not expressly recognised in the Bill of Rights 
1990 (BORA), it has been recognised in other areas of the law and in 
international covenants. This gives privacy a high profile. 
(a) Human Right 
There is a link between privacy and the ability to develop individuality and 
creativity. Diversity promotes vitality and progress in society. 151 Privacy 
permits an emotional release, opportunity for self-evaluation and limited and 
protected communication.152 This explains why privacy has come to be seen as 
a fundamental in a society where the pressures of modem day living are 
increasing. In the Twentieth Century there has been growing recognition of 
privacy as a fundamental right. This can be illustrated by several international 
documents. 
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that no one shall 
arbitrarily interfere with the privacy, family, home or correspondence or attack 
a person's honour or reputation. This clearly puts privacy into the realm of 
fundamental rights and highlights it as something that should be preserved by 
law. Although the declaration lacks legal force it carries moral force. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR), of 
which New Zealand is a signatory, also refers to privacy in Article 17. Our own 
BORA does not specifically refer to privacy. However, privacy is implicit 
under section 21 which deals with unreasonable search and seizure. 
Underlying search and seizure is the extent to which the state can invade the 
personal privacy and sovereign sphere of the individual.153 Recognition 
through the ICCPR alone may support its recognition and strength in the 
151 Arthur Schafer "Privacy: A Philosophical Overview" Dale Gibson (ed) Aspects of Privacy 
uiw: Essays in Honour of John M Sharp (Butterworths, Toronto,1980) 1, 14 ["A Philosophical 
Overview"). 
152 John Mintz ''The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private 
Domain" [1996) 55 MLR 425, 428-29. 
153 "Death of the New Zealand Bill of Rights" above n7, 261. 
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common law. 
However, in Gardiner 154 our Court of Appeal was not convinced. The court 
pointed out that while our BORA affirmed the ICCPR, privacy was not 
mentioned. The court did not suggest that this meant the ICCPR had no 
influence but that it was a much longer step to argue ratification, which did not 
adopt the same relevant language, rendered video surveillance unlawful. Such 
a radical change to the common law was not to be taken as having occurred 
except by direct expression. 155 If our domestic law was an inadequate response 
to the ICCPR it was for the legislature to remedy . However, the Court of 
Appeal's reasoning is unpersuasive. Why should the courts not incorporate 
international standards into the common law? 
There is dicta disagreeing with the Court of Appeal's approach. Lord Cooke 
suggested that international covenants reflect society's expectations. He 
considered that international standards may be taken into account in shaping 
the common law.156 Arguably it is not just empty rhetoric, we need up to date 
torts. The common should reflect society's values. Covenants can be used to 
legitimise the extension of the common law and help it to grow. 
The views of Lord Cooke accord with Justice Sedley. The common law 
atmosphere has changed in the last few decades. Canada's Charter 
transformed legal and political cultures, as did the Australian constitution. The 
success of these rights is a consequence of courts and lawyers, courts 
understand human rights and the human rights culture.157 The 
constitutionalisation of the common law is not arbitrary . Statutes like the 
BORA and international covenants are the new sources of rights. 
Sedley considers that fundamental human rights should not be actionable only 
between individuals and the state. Instead these rights should have a cascade 
effect so that they are also enforceable between individuals. It is the court's role 
to incorporate fundamental rights into the common law. Our courts should be 
154 Gardiner above nlO, 3-4. 
155 Gardi11er above nlO, 4. 
156 Hunter v Canan; Wharf[1997] 2 All ER 430,458 [Canary W11arf] . 
157 "Private & Public" above n8. 
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taking up the challenge rather than shying away from it. 
The common law may be able to develop with the needs of modern society 
without constitutional provisions.158 It may prefer to develop without 
reference to an external force.159 Justice Gault seems to be of the view that 
fundamental social rights can be incorporated into the law even if not referred 
to in the BORA. The modern declarations of rights are in fact a progression in 
an evolutionary process rather than a departure from the common law.160 The 
dynamics of the common law do not end with the BORA. Although some 
rights have been specifically listed, other rights exist independent of the Act. 
Gault specifically refers to the possibility of a privacy right.161 There will 
continue to be an evolution of rights recognisable in the common law. 
(b) Legislation and Dicta Supporting Privacy 
There has been very strong dicta in support of privacy. Woodhouse P said:162 
The courts will always be careful to guard and protect personal freedoms including the 
right to privacy. 
But the importance of privacy is also evident elsewhere. An aspect of control 
over police powers of search, entry and questioning, 163 deciding whether to 
publish names 164 and the fact that the right to a lawyer in s23(1)(b) of the BORA 
should be exercised in reasonable privacy are examples of privacy's 
recognition. The list goes on.165 
The Privacy Act 1993 though dealing with regulation of the collection, use and 
158 Tucker above n53, 733. "While American authorities have a degree of foundation upon 
constitutional provisions not available in New Zealand, the good sense and social desirability 
of the protective principles enunciated are compelling. I do not think it beyond the common 
law to adapt the Wilkinson v Downton principles to significantly develop the same field and 
same needs." 
159 See l.Jmge v Atkinson (25 May 1998) unreported, Court of Appeal, CA 52/ 97. Where the 
court made a significant addition to the defence of qualified privilege but without a lot of 
reference to the Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
160 Simpson v AG (1994) 1 HRNZ 42, 94 [Baigent's Case]. 
161 Baigent's Case above n160, 94. 
162 R v Owen [1982) 2 NZLR 416,417. 
163 See for example Transport Ministry v Payn [1977) 2 NZLR 50. 
164 Re T [1975) 2 NZLR 449. 
165 See Tlze Law of Torts above n3, 963. 
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storage of information is still recognition of privacy's importance, although that 
may not be one of its main aims. 
In introducing public disclosure McGechan J carefully justified the new tort on 
the basis of legislative recognition of privacy, listing several statutes.166 At the 
same time McGechan made it clear legislative action would be preferable: 
the courts are being forced into a position where they must soon create new law as 
they see appropriate. 
This seems to accord with McLachlin that the courts are obliged to act where 
legislatures are reluctant and there is a need in society. Protection of privacy 
has a direct effect on the media. The press has the ability to make Members of 
Parliament unpopular. This could explain why the legislature has not acted.167 
Popularity and publicity are important for politicians. 
2 Unlawful Interference 
The judiciary see their duty as promoting entrepreneurial activity and there 
may be a judicial preoccupation with enhancing commercial morality. 168 This 
helps explain the creation and continued development of the economic torts. 
The economic torts can be used to control trade competition and industrial 
pressure. 169 The courts' aim may be admirable in attempting to achieve better 
commercial behaviour, but is it an appropriate role? 
The law may have needed to change to keep up with changing commercial 
practices but it may be questioned whether the courts rather than the 
legislature should be engaging in this policy making.170 It is arguable that the 
courts have interfered with policy underlying legislation.171 This tort has 
affected union strikes which is a delicate area. Heydon notes that in many 
jurisdictions unlawful interference has been modified by statue.172 
166 Tucker above n53, 733. 
167 P Prescott" Kaye v Robertson- A Reply" [1991] MLR 451. 
168 "Limitations on the Action" above n23, 241-242. 
169 "Intentional Violation of Economic Interests" above n44, 250. 
170 JD Heydon Economic Torts (2ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1978) 10 [Eco,wmic Torts]. 
171 Eco,wmic Torts above n170, 10. 
172 Eco,wmic Torts above n170, 70. 
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However, in New Zealand the Employment Contracts Act 1991 accepts and 
endorses the existence and suitability of the economic torts in the industrial 
area.173 It confirms the necessity of establishing whether industrial action is 
lawful or unlawful for the purpose. For example, if picketing is lawful it will 
not involve the commission of a civil wrong. The recognition of the wider tort 
of unlawful interference may extend liability here.174 Unlawful interference is 
expressly referred to in the Act. 175 This clearly suggests the legislature 
acquiesces in judicial intervention is this area, otherwise why would they 
include it in statute? Unlawful interference's inclusion is related to our 
government's policies which favour employers and are anti-unions. Unlawful 
interference was previously used against unions. The Employment Contracts 
Act is a tool to achieve these policies. 
Unlawful interference is the result of judicial policy recognised since the late 
nineteenth century that defendants should not be able to harm the business 
interests of another by unlawful means.176 Such acts are not legitimate 
competition. 
There could be several rationales to explain the courts' creativity, the economic 
view of tort law, the idea that tort law is concerned with protecting morality or 
simply that the courts are being pragmatic. 177 On the pragmatic approach the 
courts try to prevent unfairness in business and see themselves as protectors of 
society, controlling what certain groups within society do. This is a 
combination of economic analysis and morality .178 Fridman criticises this 
because it gives the court too great a role in the governance of society. There is 
no problem with the economic or morality analysis, as he sees this as a more 
valid way of interpreting and understanding the common law .179 
However, 'unlawful means' is a wide and vague concept. No objection might 
arise had the courts limited 'unlawful means' to criminal acts or other torts. 
173 The Law of Torts above n3, 735. 
174 The Law of Torts above n3, 751-52. 
175 Employment Contracts Act 1991, s73(1). 
176 "Interference with Economic Relations" above n60, 624. 
177 "Interference with Trade Part II" above n27, 121. 
178 "Interference with Trade Part 11" above n27, 121. 
179 "Interference with Trade Part II" above n27, 121. 
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Most people would see this as inappropriate conduct. This has been extended 
to contract breaches and threats. There are many uncertainties however. Will 
any breach of contract be sufficient? Breach of statute may not be sufficient 
here.180 
Another problem is that there is no uniform approach to what constitutes 
'unlawful means' amongst the economic torts. If unlawful interference is a 
genus tort meaning the other unlawful means torts are a subspecies, 'unlawful 
means' would be expected to be interchangeable.181 This is uncertain. There 
are also emerging areas of unlawful means such as misuse of confidential 
information and economic duress.182 A lot of questions are yet to be resolved. 
Some propose a very wide definition of 'unlawful means'. Lord Denning 
thought that "any act by the defendant which he is not at liberty to commit" 
would suffice.183 This leaves a lot of power in the judge's hands. Should this 
include action against the public interest? 184 Bedggood suggests distinguishing 
between acts actionable except for some technicality or defence available, and 
acts where there is no liability however morally reprehensible the conduct.185 
There is a lot of room for uncertainty. 
'Interference with a business' includes affecting the performance of a contract 
or future economic prospects. Emms and Van Camp suggest that making a 
business less profitable could be included.186 Here the law becomes unclear. 
The moral line may be harder to find. 
The judge's task has been to balance too little competition and too much which 
180 Van Camp above n45, 359. 
181 The Law of Torts above n3, 723. 
182 The Law of Torts above n3, 723-24. 
183 Torquay above n80, 139. 
184 Jn Associated Newspaper Group Ltd v Wade [1979) ICR 664 referring to interference with 
freedom of the press, although not supported as the ground of the decision. This has not been 
supported though according to Carty, see "Intentional Violation of Economic Interests" above 
n44, 266. 
185 The Law of Torts above n3, 725. For example in National Phonograph Co Ltd v Edison Bell 
Consolidated Phonograph Co Ltd [1908] 1 Ch 335, fraud had not resulted in damage and therefore 
could not constitute the tort of deceit, but it was admitted as 'unlawful means'. 
186 The Law of Torts above n3, 718. Emms above n80 and Van Camp above n45. 
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has resulted in the intentional torts.187 Controlling business is arguably a more 
suitable function for the legislature when it touches the business and 
employment worlds, which are of vital importance to the economy. However, 
traditional judicial intervention in this area and the fact that the other economic 
torts regulate the same type of behaviour may have led the courts to adopt 
unlawful interference. 
Why has New Zealand not shown great enthusiasm for unlawful interference? 
Perhaps it is partly due to the Commerce Act 1986 and Fair Trading Act 1986 
which regulate unfair competition. The courts may see this area as more 
appropriate for the legislature. 
The underlying policy of unlawful interference was also more popular in the 
1970s than today. The climate has changed in New Zealand. There is less 
interest now in protecting businesses, instead Government's view (and of the 
political right) is that they should be exposed to the rigours of the free market. 
Further, privacy's success is partly due to it becoming a significant human right 
in modem society. Whereas, unlawful interference is an economic right, 
financial interests are arguably less important. 
B Necessity for Protection 
1 Privacy 
Was the introduction of a privacy tort brought about by some necessity or gap 
in the law that the courts saw as needing to be filled? There was arguably a 
need. Other common law causes of action provided some protection, but 
perhaps at the risk of being distorted themselves. Cases could fall through the 
gaps. 
187 "Interference with Economic Relations" above n60, 625. 
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(a) Modern Technology and Society 
Modem industrial society may have greater opportunities for privacy. We 
generally live in nuclear families in individual households. There is anonymity 
in urbanisation. Mobility and less religious control contribute to privacy .188 
However, modem technology poses a threat. The growth in surveillance and 
technology may create a greater need for privacy protection. The courts' 
awareness of this need in modem society may have spurred them to act. 
Modem technology was a factor recognised by Warren and Brandeis as 
endangering privacy in 1890. Instantaneous photos, the development of 
widespread publication and other devices, such as the means to surreptitiously 
take photos, meant that what was "whispered in the closet'' would be 
"proclaimed from the house-tops" )89 The intensity and complexity of life 
meant privacy was necessary. 190 Further, mental injury can cause more pain 
than physical injury. These are sentiments that may be even more relevant 
today than they were then. 
Twentieth Century developments have further increased the risks to privacy. 
Technology has made extensive surveillance relatively easy and inexpensive. 
Video cameras have been described as the "newest threat to privacy" )91 
Although it is not the only device available. 
Cameras with powerful zoom lenses, microphones and transmitters, easy to 
conceal cameras, night vision glasses and devices to track vehicles exist. Photos 
may be taken from space satellites able to pinpoint houses.192 In Tucker the 
court referred to the pressing need for protection due to increasing population 
pressures and computerised information retrieval systems.193 Privacy is said to 
be the result of a communications and information revolution which has 
188 A Westin Privacy and Freedom (Bodley Head, London, 1970) 21. 
189 ''The Right to Privacy" above n49, 195. 
190 ''The Right to Privacy" above n49, 196. 
191 "Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet" above n41, 1017. 
192 See "Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet" above n41, 1018-19. 
193 Tucker above n53, 733. 
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increased our vulnerability to unwanted intrusion.194 However, our 
expectations for privacy, confidentiality and security remain. 
Added to this is the increasing commercialisation and sensationalism of the 
media.195 We are said to live in an increasingly intrusive and uncivil society.1% 
The press is interested in stories that may pander more to the public's interests 
than the public interest. Doubtful methods are sometimes employed to obtain 
stories. 197 Our privacy is at risk. 
Then there are the reality television shows based on filming real events as they 
happen. Shows may follow the police or emergency services as they work. 
Hidden cameras, listening devices and microphones may serve the public 
interest, 198 but more often the practice may amount to lazy journalism and 
unwarranted intrusion.199 
Well grounded fears about the ability of individuals to protect themselves 
against unwarranted intrusions have arisen.200 Courts cannot be oblivious to 
these developments. 
(b) Common Law Protection 
How well does the common law protect privacy without the help of an 
independent tort? Privacy interests have been protected to some extent by the 
common law and equity. According to Burns other causes of action have 
mainly been helpful when property, reputation or physical integrity were also 
present.201 
194 David J Seipp "English Judicial Recognition of a Right to Privacy" 11983] 3 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 325, 370 [ "English Judicial Recognition"]. 
195 " A Philosophical Overview" above n151, 2-3. 
1% "Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet" above n41, 1009. 
197 See Mrs S v TV3 Network Services Ltd BSA 1/ 94 and Marris v TV 3 Network Ltd (14 October 
1991), unreported, High Court, Wellington Registry, CP 754/91 as examples of intrusive 
reporters. 
198 "Crimewatch" on Television 2 is an example of a show where the intrusion may be 
justified. 
199 ''Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet'' above n41, 1015. 
200 "A Philosophical Overview" above n151, 4. 
201 "Privacy and the Common Law" above n26, 24. 
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(i) Defamation 
The test for an injunction under defamation is extremely high. The reasonable 
jury must inevitably find that the statement was defamatory. Unless an 
injunction is granted privacy may be lost. It is difficult to argue that damages 
after the fact restore the harm of publication, as in the case of defamation. 
Further, if truth is going to be pleaded the courts are extremely reluctant to 
grant an injunction. The courts are reluctant to inhibit freedom of speech. Just 
because the information is true does not mean that there would not be a serious 
breach of privacy if published. The truth can hurt more than lies.202 
Defamation is narrower than privacy. 
Sympathetic judges and juries could also look for inaccuracies in detail in an 
otherwise truthful account.203 Alternatively they could interpret disclosures of 
personal information as unprivileged. There is a risk of distortion of 
defamation to protect privacy. 
There are limits to the protection that defamation can offer. Arguably 
defamation could not effectively protect privacy unless it was expanded.204 
Privacy and defamation overlap. If defamation contained a 'public interest' 
qualification it would protect to some degree privacy where disclosures 
affected reputation.205 But this still requires changes to the current defamation 
law. 
(ii) Trespass 
Trespass controls the access others have to enter our property where we have 
exclusive possession or ownership. It provides us with a private space and 
remedy for an invasion of land.206 The legal doctrine that a "man's house is his 
202 "Our Patchy Law of Privacy" above n38, 808. 
203 "English Judicial Recognition" above n194, 343. 
204 "Privacy and the Common Law" above n26, 31. 
205 Tire Lilw oJTorts above n3, 959. 
206 Tlze Lilw of Torts above n3, 460. 
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castle" for safety and repose can be traced back hundreds of years.207 An 
Englishman had legitimate recourse to physical violence and trespass to protect 
his home.208 A trespass remedy was available whatever the motivation for the 
intrusion. The courts placed great value on the private repose and security of a 
man in his home.209 Property owners were successful in preventing 
observation of their houses by curious strangers. 
Trespass may protect privacy, but not always. The first problem is that not 
everybody owns or has exclusive possession of land, in which case they would 
not have standing to sue. The second difficulty is proving entry. 
Bathurst 210 illustrates why the entry requirement is problematic. The 
defendants had taken photos and video of the plaintiff's land without consent. 
Unfortunately there was no entry. The photos were taken from neighbouring 
land and the footpath. There was no tortious conduct.211 A person may be 
under surveillance or watched without a trespass ever occurring. 
In Bernstein 212 there was no entry because the plane taking photos flew above 
the area of reasonable use. There is no authority for preventing the taking of 
photos for an innocent purpose provided a tort such as trespass or nuisance 
was not committed in doing so.213 
Even when there is an entry if the purpose is bona fide there will not be 
liability. However, in Lincoln Hunt 214 the defendants, who were from the 
television media, entered the plaintiffs business premises with their cameras 
rolling. The court held that there was an implied licence but only for limited 
purposes, that is legitimate commercial or business purposes. In some 
circumstances this case may be helpful. However, there will often be room for 
argument on whether or not the defendant exceeded their permission to 
207 See Semayne's Case (1605) 77 Eng Rep 194, 194. 
208 "English Judicial Recognition" above nl 94, 344. 
209 Burdett v Abbott (1811) 14 East 1, 154--155, 104 Eng Rep 501, 560. 
210 Bathurst CC v Saban (1985) 2 NSWLR 704 [Bathurst]. 
211 Bathurst above n210, 706. 
212 Bernstein v Skyviews {1978] QB 479 f Bernstein]. 
213 Bernstein above n212, 488. 
214 Lincoln Huntv Willesee (1986) 4 NSWLR 457 I Lincoln Hunt]. 
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enter.215 
The strength of the trespass cause of action is that it is unlikely that there will 
be a public interest defence to trespass.216 The courts tend to be very firm in 
protecting proprietary interests. There is a strong privacy interest at the heart 
of trespass, but in some circumstances this cause of action will not be very 
effective. 
( iii) Private Nuisance 
Private nuisance also protects the plaintiff's interests in land. Private nuisance 
deals with actions on the defendant's land which cause interference with the 
plaintiff's enjoyment of his/ her land. 217 The courts have not been very willing 
to use nuisance to protect privacy although it has succeeded in some cases.218 
A plaintiff invoked nuisance to enjoin his neighbour from holding parties 
attracting crowds which destroyed his privacy.219 
In Bernstein the court considered that if the plaintiff was subjected to constant 
surveillance and his activities were photographed, the court may regard such 
an invasion of privacy as an actionable nuisance.220 But that was not the case. 
In Khorasandjian221 the plaintiff was being harassed in her home by the 
defendant's persistent telephone calls. She was not the owner of the house and 
did not have exclusive possession of the property. Yet the majority still used 
nuisance to protect her.222 However, Gibson J (dissenting) considered that a 
proprietary interest in the land was still required to sue in nuisance.223 The 
215 The Law of Torts above n3, 956. 
216 Lincoln Hunt above n214, 461. 
217 The Law of Torts above n3, 460. 
218 The Law of Torts above n3, 957. Cases where it has been used include Mothenvell v Mothenvell 
(1976) 73 DLR (3d) 62; Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727 and Walker v Brewster (1867) 47 LQR 
23, 27 [ Brewster]. 
219 Brewster above n218, 26. 
220 Bernstein above n212, 489. 
221 Khorasandjian above n 218. 
222 KJwrasandjian above n218, 734. 
223 KJ1orasandjian above n218, 745. 
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House of Lords agreed in Canary Wharf.224 Lord Goff considered that extension 
of the tort to occupiers of land would transform nuisance from a tort to land to 
a tort to the person, distorting nuisance.225 
However, Lord Cooke was prepared to extend nuisance to the protect people 
living in their homes. Unless Cooke's approach is adopted in New Zealand 
nuisance's protection of privacy is limited to owners or those with exclusive 
possession of land. 
(iv) Breach of Confidence 
In theory, breach of confidence could protect privacy regarding the collection of 
information about people.226 This tort may provide one of the best avenues of 
protection of privacy .227 There have been successful cases.228 It is easier to get 
an injunction under breach of confidence compared with defamation, and other 
equitable remedies may be available. 
Breach of confidence can be used where there exists a relationship and 
confidential information is shared, or even in the absence of a relationship.229 If 
it would be unconscionable in the circumstances, publication may also be 
restrained. However, information in the public domain is not confidential.230 
Under public disclosure this is not necessarily the case. The New Zealand court 
has cited Melvin231 and Briscoe 232 as the American approach to the tort where 
the plaintiffs were allowed to retreat into the past.233 
In Tucker the court seemed to focus more on a legitimate public interest test 
224 Canary Wharf above n156, 426. 
225 Canary Wharf above n156, 439. 
226 Stephens v Avery [1988] 2 All ER 477 [Steplzens]. 
227 Younger Committee on Privacy (CMND 5012, 1972) and the Australian Law Reform 
Commission's Report on Privacy, Report No 22 (1983), para 827 ff. 
228 Steplzens above 226, illustrates that breach of confidence protects privacy quite well. Other 
cases which used breach of confidence to protect privacy are: Prince Albert v Strange above n82; 
ArgtJll v Argyll [1967] Ch 302; Xv Y [ 1988] 2 All ER. 
229 The Law of Torts above n3, 961-962. 
230 See discussion in A-G (UK) v Wellington Newspapers Ltd [ 1988] 1 NZLR 129. 
231 Melvin above n 122. 
232 Briscoe above n123. 
233 Tucker above n53, 733. 
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rather than whether or not the information had been in the public domain.234 
In fact, publication by one part of the media has been held to mean that the 
story is not so public that all media can publish it. 235 So unless 'confidential 
information' can include information that has already been in the public 
domain, there are gaps in protection. This tort could be distorted to protect 
pnvacy. 
Breach of confidence also has a public interest defence. Courts have to balance 
two conflicting interests, the public interest in people being informed of matters 
of real public interest and the public interest in the maintenance of confidence 
generally.236 The balancing in privacy cases may be particularly sensitive.237 
Arguably, breach of confidence does not provide a sound basis to protect all 
uses of information, knowledge and attributes about a person.238 Privacy 
which deals with an individual's sensibility and dignity.239 Breach of 
confidence does not have privacy interests as its primary concern. If privacy is 
secondary, weighing it against other social aims will be uncertain.240 
If privacy is, or should be, an intentional tort breach of confidence could be 
problematic. Intention is unimportant to liability under this head.241 It may be 
desirable though to restrict privacy to intentional acts only. 
(v) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Harm 
The test for intentional infliction is that the defendant has wilfully done an act 
calculated to cause physical harm to the plaintiff and has in fact caused physical 
234 Tucker above n53, 732. Justice McGechan cites Justice Jefferies' judgment from the High Court which he seems to approve: "The gravamen of the action is unwarranted publication of intimate details of the plaintiffs private life which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern, or curiosity". 
235 A v TVNZ (25 March 1996) unreported, High Court, Wellington Registry, CP 55/96 7. 
236 Lion Lilboratories v Evans [1985] 1 QB 526, 536. 
237 The Law of Torts above n3, 967. 
238 "Limitations on the Action" above n23, 227. 
239 "Limitations on the Action" above n23, 227. 
240 "Limitations on the Action" above n23, 255. 
241 "Limitations on the Action" above n23, 237-238. 
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harm.242 The problem with intentional infliction arises out of the physical harm 
requirement. The court looks at the person of ordinary state of health and 
rnind.243 It is the physical harm for which damages are awarded, not for shock 
or emotional harm. 
In Khorasandjian Gibson J thought that cumulative stress may be enough to 
satisfy the harm requirement, where if unrestrained the defendant's behaviour 
would continue and impair the plaintiff's health.244 However, how long does 
the behaviour need to go on for before it is evident that the plaintiff will break 
down? Unless physical harm is dropped, intentional infliction has too high a 
threshold to effectively protect privacy. 
(c) A New Tort? 
There are gaps in the protection that the common law can provide. Indirect 
protection must of necessity be partial as privacy even in its most modest 
definition is wider than the existing torts.245 A separate tort is preferable rather 
than a variety of common law actions for coherence and clear recognition of the 
interest that is being protected. If the harm is severe enough, the gap should be 
filled. This reinforces the value we place on privacy. 
Further, perhaps common law torts are filling most of the gaps, but there is a 
danger other causes of action are being stretched. In Kaye the plaintiff was 
successful in obtaining an injunction because the judges were sympathetic and 
willing to be persuaded that something should be done.246 There may be a loss 
of coherence to other causes of action. The court may not be taking into 
account all the consequences of extending the tort at the time. 
242 Wilkinson above n54. The question is whether the defendant's act was so obviously 
calculated to produce some effect of the kind that was produced so intention can be imputed to 
the defendant. Stevenson above n55, however, suggests that negligence may be enough for 
liability. 
243 Wilkinson above n54, 59. 
244 Klzorasandjian above n218, 746. 
245 T1ze Law of Torts above n3, 955. 
246 "Our Patchy Law of Privacy" above n38, 804-805. 
43 
Kalven considered that the tort of privacy was trivial and unnecessary.247 
Although he considered that privacy was of great value, a tort to protect it was 
an error.248 It was the lofty rhetoric and recognition of the spiritual side of 
people that captured judges' attention but to Kalven privacy did not deserve 
such attention. 
Yet courts even in countries where privacy has not been recognised have seen a 
need for it and encouraged legislative action. It was judicial conservatism 
arguably that held them back. They would not seem to agree the tort is 
petty.249 The English Court of Appeal appeared to advocate a separate tort for 
privacy. It quoted Markesinis:250 
True, many aspects of ... privacy are protected by the multitude of existing torts but 
this means fitting the facts of each case in the pigeon hole of an existing tort and this 
process may not only involve strained constructions; often it may also leave a 
deserving plaintiff without a remedy. 
The breadth of protection required seems to support a separate tort. 
New Zealand relatively recently adopted the tort believing there was a need for 
protection. McGechan J supported the introduction of the tort because it made 
good sense and was socially desirable.251 
(d) Are All of the Privacy Torts Necessary? 
Prosser considered the privacy torts were supported by public demand and 
feeling, made necessary by real abuses.252 However, all four privacy torts may 
not be required in New Zealand. 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority's Opinion253 may guide the courts in 
247 "Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?" (1966) 31 Law and Contemp Probs 326,337 ["Were 
Warren and Brandeis Wrong?"). 
248 "Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?" above n247, 327-328. "[F)ascination with the great 
Brandeis trade mark, excitement over the law at a point of growth, and appreciation of privacy 
as a key value have combined to dull the normal critical sense of judges and commentators and 
have caused them not to see the pettiness of the tort they have sponsored." 
249 Kaye above n4, 155. 
250 Professor Markesinis 111e Gemum Law of Tarts (2ed, 1990) 316. 
251 Tucker above n53, 733. 
252 "Privacy" above n43, 423. 
253 "BSA Advisory Opinion" above n9. 
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deciding what privacy torts are necessary in New Zealand. Public disclosure 
and intrusion are included. The exclusion of misappropriation and false light 
seems to suggest they are unnecessary. 
Misappropriation seems more about property than privacy. New Zealand 
should not introduce misappropriation as a privacy tort. False light overlaps 
significantly with defamation.254 Yet it seems advantageous to have a limited 
false light tort because statements may be false but not defamatory.255 The 
harm is that there is a mismatch or conflict between the plaintiff's actual 
identity and his identity in the minds of others. This conflict may itself be 
offensive or disorienting.256 
Public disclosure and intrusion would also be valuable additions to the courts' 
armoury, filling in the gaps left in the common law. For example, intrusion is 
important because technology means there may never be a physical trespass. 
2 Unlawful Interference 
Unlawful interference arguably has not caught the imagination of lawyers and 
the courts in the same way as privacy. Despite academic support for the 
rationalisation of the economic torts, judicial acceptance has been slow.257 The 
courts have preferred to find one of the other economic torts where unlawful 
interference might have applied. 
Unlawful interference provides a rationale basis to the economic torts by 
revealing the basic principle underlying the other economic torts.258 This way 
the law has a more secure and logical foundation. A more logical division 
could be established between those requiring independent illegal means (such 
254 Renwick v News Obseroer Pub Co (1984) 312 SE 2d 405,413. The court considered that 
recognition of false light would reduce judicial efficiency by requiring courts to reconsider two 
claims for the same relief that if not identical would not differ signjficantly. 
255 "False Light" above n91, 893. Schwartz points out several categories where the statement is 
false but may not be defamatory. For example, the statement might make false claims about 
private aspects of plaintiff's lives, about the plaintiff's personal thoughts, ascribe virtues the 
plaintiff does not have. 
256 "False Light" above n91, 898. 
257 "Civil Liability for Industrial Action" above n70, 367. 
258 "Economic Torts & Labour Law" above n74, 336. 
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as indirect contractual interference, intimidation, conspiracy by illegal means 
and unlawful interference) and those that do not (including direct contractual 
interference and conspiracy to injure).259 
However, rationalising the basis of the economic torts is more of academic 
interest than necessity. The courts may be more interested in pragmatic 
solutions than tidying up this group of torts. 
Unlawful interference may be less necessary or arise less frequently than 
privacy. The New Zealand Court of Appeal seems to suggest it will be used 
infrequently. If though the tort is a means to achieve justice in the 
circumstances then it is still a valuable tool:260 
It is a recognised tort in New Zealand, although its boundaries wiU receive closer 
definition as cases emerge, and we see insufficient reason for discarding a judicial 
remedy which from time to time may be useful to prevent injustice. 
Frequency may not be an important factor. But there may not be many cases 
where unlawful interference is the only available cause of action. 
Unlawful interference may be easier to prove than other economic torts, for 
example making it unnecessary to prove conspiracy or combination.261 It is 
also useful when the unlawful conduct does not fit within the other economic 
torts.262 Further, unlawful interference protects not simply the plaintiff's legal 
rights but also his/her wider interests.263 For example it may protect an 
employer's business expectations, there does not need to be an existing 
contract. 
However, unlawful interference is a parasitic cause of action on unlawful 
means. Therefore, often other causes of action may exist.264 This factor is said 
to explain the delay in the emergence of the tort. Although sometimes the 
unlawful means aspect of the tort may not be independently actionable or may 
259 "Civil Liability for Industrial Action" above n70, 360. 
260 Van Camp above n45, 359. 
261 "Tort Injury to Economic Interests" above n96, 147. 
262 "Economic Torts & Labour Law" above n74, 335. 
263 "Economic Torts & Labour Law" above n74, 336. 
264 "Economic Torts & Labour Law" above n74, 335. 
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be directed at a third party in order to harm the plaintiff .265 This is where 
unlawful interference can play a role. 
Arguably though there is not the same necessity for unlawful interference, 
without it the courts could still control inappropriate conduct causing 
economic harm. Fridman considers that in some cases the use of unlawful 
interference was an unnecessary addition for the plaintiff to obtain a 
remedy. Secondly, even though not pleaded, another cause of action was 
available to ensure a remedy without unlawful interference.266 Fridman 
contends the existence of this tort should be reexamined to see if it is logical 
or justified.267 
Even if unlawful interference is not strictly necessary it is still useful. 
Unlawful interference would be 'necessary' if the existing protection was 
inadequate and too many cases were falling through the cracks. It is 'useful' 
though because it provides for the rare cases that would otherwise go 
remediless, makes liability easier to prove and provides doctrinal clarity. 
Necessity may differentiate unlawful interference from privacy. Although 
even if privacy was not strictly necessary either, it would be a value worth 
reinforcing. 
C Importance of the Parties and Interest 
1 Privacy 
(a) In America 
It is suggested that the ability of judges to identify and/ or sympathise with 
plaintiffs or defendants may be one of the factors that determines whether 
courts will extend the common law. 
265 "Economic Torts & Labour Law" above n74, 335. 
266 "Interference with Trade Part II" above n27, 121. Fridman cites Lonrlw v Fayed above n62 
as a case were unlawful interference was not necessary, they were also suing in conspiracy . He 
considers injurious falsehood was another possible cause of action. 
267 "Interference with Trade Part TI" above n27, 122. 
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In America, when privacy was in the early stages of development, this was 
arguably a factor. In Roberson268 the New York Court of Appeal had an 
opportunity to recognise privacy. The defendants had used a young lady's 
picture to advertise their flour without her consent. The court held that 
there was no protection available. The lack of precedent, purely mental 
injury and danger of a lot of litigation were the reasons given for no 
liability. Perhaps the outcome was due to the court's inability to see the 
injury when it was not defamatory. Maybe the judges could not identify 
with this woman's distress at having her picture used.269 However, there 
was great public disapproval for the decision. This lead the legislature to 
act.270 
In Pavesich271 the court did recognise privacy. The defendant insurance 
company had used the plaintiff's name and photo without permission, 
including a testimonial supposedly written by him, to advertise. The 
plaintiff was arguably someone with whom the court could identify and the 
defendant was using the plaintiff's name and likeness for profit without 
consent. 
(b) In New Zealand 
In Tucker the plaintiff had previously been convicted of indecency, but the 
court was not without sympathy for him.272 Tucker was in need of a heart 
transplant and had sought donations from the public to finance the 
operation. The media was threatening publication of the details of his 
conviction. The stress of this could have killed him. Tucker also had a 
daughter, which may also have motivated the judge to be sympathetic to 
268 Roberson v Rochester Folding Box Co (1902) 64 NE 442 [Roberson] . 
269 Roberson above n268, 443. "Such publicity, which some find agreeable, is to the plaintiff 
very distasteful...she has been caused to suffer mental distress where others would have 
appreciated the compliment to their beauty implied in the selection of the picture for such 
purposes ... " The court seems to be saying she should be flattered rather than be upset. 
270 "Privacy" above n43, 385. 
271 Pavesich above n52. 
272 Tucker above n53, 725. Justice McGechan says, "Mr Tucker in the past has had at least one 
episode of suicidal tendencies, and in the past has sought psychiatric assistance. He may 
have a psychiatric or medical problem constituting a background to these convictions. I do not 
know, but I accept the possibility and the need for a sympathetic approach" . 
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Tucker's desire for privacy.273 Cases since then have also involved 
sympathetic plaintiffs.274 
The fact that the interest protected is easy to identify with is another factor 
that may encourage extension of the common law and help explain 
privacy's relative success. Everybody can identify with the desire for privacy 
on some level. Further, privacy is available potentially to anybody. 
The court was presented with the opportunity of introducing the intrusion 
tort into New Zealand for video surveillance and wire tapping in the cases 
of Fraser and Gardiner. The court's refusal to do so may be related to the 
nature of the parties in those cases. Arguably the court turned away from 
privacy when faced with 'bad' defendants. 
For Gardiner and Fraser to establish their cause of action under section 21 of 
the BORA they had to show the search was unreasonable. If they had 
established a breach of privacy this would have gone a long way to 
establishing 'unreasonableness'. The court said 'reasonableness' required a 
balancing of reasonable expectations of privacy and the state's interest in 
detecting crime.275 Intrusion could have been recognised. In both cases the 
police had Fraser and Gardiner under video surveillance and wiretapping 
over a period of months in drug dealing investigations. Gardiner was 
under surveillance longer with the video aimed to catch activity inside the 
kitchen, which also had a zoom function. 
Fraser was dealing in class B drugs. Gardiner was also dealing in serious 
drugs, supplying and possessing morphine and conspiring to manufacture 
heroin. 
273 Tucker above n53, 735. The Court must have some regard to the interests of an innocent 
infant. 
27 4 In Bradley above n93, the plaintiffs were an elderly couple whose family tomb was 
filmed in the background of a splatter movie. In Morgan v TVNZ (1 March 1990) unreported, 
High Court, Auckland Registry, CP 765/92, TVNZ wanted to make a documentary involving a 
child who had been involved in a custody dispute. Although privacy was denied in the case 
of an arguably 'deserving' plaintiff when information was disclosed to a natural parent 
enabling the identification of the adoptive parents. However, public disclosure was not 
satisfied and another cause of action was possible, see Xv AG [1994] NZFLR 433, 439. 
275 Fraser above n90, 452. 
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The police's action is described as diligent policing which had the support of 
the community. Their conduct was held to be reasonable.276 The court was 
arguably better able to identify and sympathise with the police. 
In other circumstances the result may have been different.277 In Gardiner 
the court notes that the video was not trained on a bedroom, bathroom or 
other area of particular privacy .278 The problem with this reasoning is that 
intimate conduct may occur in the kitchen or dinning room so they are 
areas of particular privacy. 
This may be compared with a Broadcasting Authority decision suggesting a 
plaintiff may have an action where there is surreptitious filming of a 
reporter requesting an interview at the plaintiff's door, even if the filming is 
on public property .279 In such a case the reporter's actions were 
underhanded. 
Schwartz considers that the court will invariably give weight to the 
result.280 The fact that incriminating evidence was found diminishes the 
weight to be given to privacy because after all these people were criminals 
and not very nice. It is suggested that the courts should not be swayed by the 
actual individuals before them or the result. 
In cases like Gardiner where the police are able to trespass onto private 
property to seek evidence or videotape inside our homes for months the 
end result is a society that is less free.281 The court should have focused on 
the importance of privacy and not have down played the invasion because 
276 Fraser above n90, 453. See also Gardiner above nlO, 7. 
277 Fraser above n90, 452. 
278 Gardiner above nlO, 8. Schwartz points out that the Court of Appeal is 'moving back the 
goal posts' see "Death of the New Zealand Bill of Rights" above n7, 262-263. In Fraser the 
court suggested there may have been a reasonable expectation of privacy if the surveillance 
was inside the house. Then in Gardiner the court suggests the result may have been different 
had the surveillance been of an area of particular privacy. Until Bradley where the court 
says there is no great privacy interest under the bath, though it might be different if the 
police looked in draws see R v Bradley (22 October 1997) unreported, Court of Appeal, 12-13. 
279 Mrs S above n197. 
280 "Death of the New Zealand Bill of Rights" above n7, 273. 
281 ''Death of the New Zealand Bill of Rights" above n7, 285. 
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the police were investigating criminals. Had protection been recognised in 
these cases ordinary individuals would be better protected. 
2 Unlawful Interference 
In Emms 282 the interference was plying the same trade as the plaintiff in 
close proximity to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was licensed and the defendant 
was taking customers away from the plaintiff. The courts could probably 
better identify with the plaintiff. The plaintiff was doing what he was legally 
entitled to do and the defendant was in breach of the city bylaw. There was a 
deserving plaintiff and an undeserving defendant who was unjustifiably 
inferring with the former' s livelihood. 
In contrast to privacy though, unlawful interference is only available to 
protect business or trade interests. It is not available to everyday people. 
VI WHY NOT UNDER NEGLIGENCE? 
A General 
There are good reasons for wanting privacy and unlawful interference to be 
intentional torts. Privacy and unlawful interference may require 'intention' 
due to conservatism. Both deal with non-physical harm. Policy reasons 
may also prevent recovery under negligence. Therefore, the courts may 
turn to intentional torts to protect the interest and this requires independent 
torts. 
Intention exists when the consequences of the conduct are both foreseen and 
desired. It may include a result where the wrongdoer believes, or ought to 
have, that harmful consequences would follow.283 Reckless or wanton acts 
are sufficient for intentional torts. Whereas if the wrongdoer foresees 
certain consequences might follow, there is knowledge and appreciation of 
282 Emms above n80. 
283 "Interference with Economic Relations" above n60, 597. 
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the risk but the risk falls short of substantial certainty, there is no 
intention.284 
B Privacy 
1 Intentional 
Why should intention be a requirement? Kalven asked a valid question 
when he said does it matter the defendant knew his/her actions were 
offensive, whether he/ she meant to refer to the plaintiff at all or thought 
the statement was privileged?285 One problematic area regarding privacy is 
whether it requires intention or even negligent acts will be actionable. 
According to Schwartz the privacy tort has always been primarily 
intentional.286 Most invasions of privacy will probably be deliberate.287 
A person who unintentionally acquires information regarding some 
personal matter does not show disrespect for that person's dignity. There is 
a connection between the duty to respect the dignity of others and the duty 
not to violate someone's privacy .288 Intrusion and public disclosure require 
that act be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person. If false light 
is adopted arguably it should require a similar element.289 An intentional 
act is more likely to trigger this factor. 
The rationale is also more likely to be intentional because emotional harm 
is caused.290 Courts are not receptive to emotional harm because of fears of 
284 "Interference with Economic Relations" above n60, 597. 
285 "Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?" above n247, 332-33. 
286 "False Light" above n91, 911. Warren and Brandeis referred to "flagrant breaches of 
decency and propriety" see "The Right to Privacy" above n49, 197. 
287 H Patrick Glenn''The Right to Privacy in Quebec Law''Dale Gibson (ed) Aspects of 
Privacy Law: Essays in Honour of John M Sharp (Butterworths, Toronto, 1980) 41, 53 l"Privacy 
in Quebec Law"]. Take for example public disclosure in Stephens above n226, if you sell 
personal information to the press it is more than foreseeable that the other person's privacy 
is breached. 
288 "A Philosophical Overview'' above n151, 18. 
289 "False Light" above n91, 904. 
290 Roberson above n268, 446. Parker CJ considered in 1902 that "the law does not yet attempt 
to guard the peace of mind, the feelings, or the happiness of everyone by giving recovery of 
damages for mental anguish produced by negligence." 
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unlimited liability, by adding intention the torts would be more 
conservative. The fact the harm is intangible, because an invasion harms a 
person's dignity, only the most culpable cases of non-intentional invasions 
are likely to be sanctioned.291 Intention probably achieves an appropriate 
balance with other rights like freedom of expression.292 
Further, if the privacy is an extension of an intentional tort, that would 
explain why a freestanding tort developed instead of a sub-category of 
negligence. Intentional infliction is generally considered an intentional tort. 
McGechan J thought the common law could adapt the Wilkinson 
principles to met the need for privacy protection.293 As pointed out in 
Bradley, seeing the privacy tort as a natural progression from intentional 
infliction could add aspects of motivation or imputed motivation.294 The 
defendant's action has to come very close to intention.295 It does not matter 
that more harm occurred than was expected. Wilkinson has a higher 
threshold test than Stevenson which suggests a standard of negligence.296 
Stevenson allows that possibility that intentional infliction be lowered to a 
negligence standard. 
Trespass could be an intentional tort or negligent.297 Intrusion is probably 
based on trespass, so if trespass requires intention so might intrusion. The 
law is not clear at the moment which is required, but the solution will be 
the same for all trespass actions.298 
2 Should Negligence Be Actionable? 
Perhaps privacy could be absorbed by negligence in the future, even if 
privacy is intentional. Trespass to the person causes of action could become 
291 "Privacy in Quebec Law" above n287, 54. 
292 "False Light'' above n91, 906. Regarding false light Schwartz says a standard of liability 
of less than recklessness might be unconstitutional, but a test of intentional or reckless 
falsehood all but eliminates unconstitutionality. 
293 Tucker above n53, 733. 
294 Bradley above n93, 423. 
295 Wilkinson above n54, 59. 
296 Stevenson above n55, 228-229 and 232. 
297 The Law of Torts above n3, 461. 
298 The Law of Torts above n3, 481. 
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actionable if negligence was proved. The modem position is probably 
intentional conduct without any independent requirement that harm be 
directly inflicted.299 But there remains the possibility that negligence is 
sufficient. False imprisonment has been held in Canada to be satisfied if 
there is negligence. A plaintiff made out a case against prison officials in 
negligence for failing to review his segregation order on time, that same 
breach of duty also established false imprisonment.300 
Whether any reformulation of the test for trespass to the person will also 
lead to a reconsideration of the nature of trespass to land remains to be seen. 
There has been little judicial comment so far.301 But if trespass includes 
negligent conduct as well as intentional, intrusion may be established by 
negligent conduct. However, this seems undesirable path. 
Privacy should be limited to intentional conduct only. Otherwise the tort 
will be too wide. If negligence is the standard then a new independent tort 
is unjustified because it is 'intention' that helps justify an independent tort. 
However, the requirement that the act be objectionable and offensive to a 
reasonable person may mean more than negligence is required. Where only 
negligence exists that element may not be met. 
C Unlawful Interference 
1 Relationship with Negligence 
The more extensive negligence becomes the less room there is for the 
traditional economic torts.302 The reason why the economic torts were 
developed can be explained by the reluctance in the past to allow recovery 
for economic loss under negligence. Where economic interests were 
negligently harmed the law was not generous.303 However, because of the 
299 The Law of Torts above n3, 103. 
300 Hill v Britis/1 Columbia [1997] 10 WWR 691, 701. 
301 The Law of Torts above n3, 103. 
302 Economic Torts above n170, see the preface. 
303 "Interference with Economic Relations" above n60, 595-96. 
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complexity of economic life recovery was needed.304 Loss arising from 
contracts or mere expectations may be of great value and importance. Even 
more value sometimes than tangible property. 
There are a number of policy arguments for limited liability in negligence. 
One argument which has force is the danger of indeterminate liability .305 
However, when the economic loss is intentionally caused many of the 
policy reasons against liability disappear and are replaced by others leading 
to liability.306 The class of plaintiffs is more limited because in most 
economic torts the defendant must aim to harm the plaintiff .307 
Fleming agreed that despite the reluctance of the common law to protect 
economic interests against negligence, there was no similar coyness in 
furnishing legal sanctions against intentional conduct causing financial 
loss.308 Therefore one of the hall marks of the economic torts is intention. 
It has been said that an interference with one's physical integrity as well as 
with lands or chattels is actionable if the inference of intention may be 
drawn. So it would be anomalous if interference with economic interests 
was treated differently .309 However, in trespass the act must be intentional 
but not the harm. 
2 Intent to Harm 
It is difficult though to identify the elements of intention required, the 
requirements vary for each economic tort.310 The plaintiff in some way 
must be the focus of the defendant's intention. Unlawful interference 
requires an intention to harm the plaintiff. 
304 Economic Torts above n170, 1. 
305 Economic Torts above n170, 7. 
306 "Interference with Economic Relations" above n60, 596. 
307 Economic Torts above n170, 9. 
308 Fleming The Law of Torts (4 ed, Law Book Co ,Sydney, 1971) 539. 
309 "Tort Injury to Economic Interests" above n96, 153. 
310 The Law of Torts above n3, 712-13. 
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In Beaudesert 311 the court seems to have suggested that illegal means, 
although the act was not aimed at the plaintiff, was sufficient. 
However,Beaudesert appears wrong, an intention to harm the plaintiff 
must be established.312 This narrows the category of potential plaintiffs, 
getting over the hurdle of indeterminate liability.313 Intentional harm 
means foreseeable economic harm will not be recoverable. There is an 
additional factor in New Zealand further limiting the tort. 
The Court of Appeal has held that a cause of action only exists where the 
defendant has a concurrent purpose to cause the plaintiff economic loss.314 
The court considered that an intent to harm a plaintiff's economic interests 
would not make the defendant liable unless that intent caused the 
defendant to act. If the defendant would have used unlawful means 
without that intent and if that intent alone would not have led him to 
act;315 
the mere existence of the purely collateral and extraneous malicious motive should 
not make all the difference. The essence of the tort is interference with the 
plaintiffs interests by unlawful means. 
If the defendant's reasons for using unlawful means are completely 
independent of a desire to interfere with the plaintiff's business, the 
interference being only an incidental, foreseeable consequence although 
gratifying to the defendant, imposing liability would be stretching the tort 
too far.316 The court's justification was otherwise the court would have to 
undertake an inquiry into the defendant's precise state of mind. Something 
that the law should not do when there is a more practicable rule.317 
Although the court does not suggest that an intention to harm is the 
primary purpose, this does not mean the test will always be easy to apply. 
Distinguishing a concurrent activating purpose from a non-causative one 
311 Beaudesert Shire Council v Smith (1966) 120 CLR 145 [Beaudesert]. 
312"Civil Liability for Industrial Action" above n70, 359. 
313 Economic Torts above n170, 8-9. 
314 Van Camp above n45, 359-360. 
315 Van Camp above n45, 360. 
316 Van Camp above n45, 360. 
317 Van Camp above n45, 360. 
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will not be easy .318 
There is an additional complication in industrial cases where for example 
strike action is aimed at the employer. Can another employer whose 
business is incidentally, but knowingly affected sue because the pressure 
he/ she will exert is part of the union strategy or is there no intention to 
harm the employer?319 This remains unclear after Van Camp. Does the 
defendant need to harm a particular plaintiff or would one in the plaintiff's 
position suffice? 
Some commentators claim only the target of the defendant's action can sue, 
excluding those inevitably harmed.320 Was the Court of Appeal in 
restricting liability trying to prevent parties inevitably harmed from suing? 
For example take the case of industrial action against an employer where 
employees or clients were incidentally harmed. If the defendant was not 
acting to hurt those clients or employees, they would have no action. The 
employer would be the only one who could succeed because only an intent 
to harm the employer caused them to act. 
An intention to harm does indicate though at least in New Zealand an 
independent tort is necessary. Although, Fridman criticises the additional 
element of concurrent purpose.321 
3 Unlawful Means 
Further, unlawful means are required to make economic harm actionable 
under this tort. It is only by the combination of intent to harm the plaintiff 
and an unlawful act that a sufficient nexus is established with the plaintiff to 
justify liability .322 Early dicta supporting liability was held to be too wide.323 
318 The Law of Torts above n3, 716. 
319 The Law of Torts above n3, 716-17. 
320 "Intentional Violation of Economic Interests" above n44, 274. 
321 "Interference with Trade Part ll" above n27, 112-113. 
322 "Economic Torts & Labour Law'' above n74, 338. 
323 See Keeble v Hickeringill (1706) 11 East 574; Carrington v Taylor (1809) 11 East 571. 
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Allen v Flood 324 limited liability. The common law would not introduce a 
general tort of interference with economic interests without unlawful 
means being used. The English courts moved away from resting liability on 
the defendant's intention.325 Unlawful means has been called the key to the 
tort.326 
Liability for damage that it is not to a property right (if the wide definition of 
property proposed by Denning is not accepted), where no contract is broken 
or hindered may extend the law too far.327 That is why liability only follows 
where unlawful means are used. 
4 Has Negligence Changed Enough to Takeover? 
The common law in New Zealand may be more receptive to economic loss 
now than when unlawful interference was first developed. Hedley Byrne328 
confirmed economic loss was recoverable in negligence. New Zealand has 
taken the view that there is no general rule against recovering financial loss 
as an ordinary principle where policy considerations allow it.329 The House 
of Lords on the other hand has vacillated between a rule of no recovery with 
Hedley Byrne being the exception, and there being no general rule and 
financial loss is recoverable where policy allows. Perhaps this makes 
unlawful interference more useful in England. 
Then there is relational loss, which is loss caused because of the contractual 
relationship between the immediate victim of a wrong and the plaintiff.330 
Traditionally the plaintiff would not succeed if he/ she only had contractual 
rights to the property. The test for when such loss will be recoverable is still 
324Allen v Flood above n73, per Lord Watson. See also lord Herschell at page 132. The House 
of Lords ruled that in the case of conspiracy the doing of an act which is lawful will not 
become unlawful through the intentional interference with the plaintiff's interests. 
325 "Interference with Economic Relations" above n60, 599. Although the principle that 
liability cannot be based on intention has not been universally embraced according to Stevens 
at page 600. She gives the example of Sorrell v Smith above n79, per Viscount Cave LC. 
326 "Interference with Economic Relations" above n60, 620. 
327 "Interference with Trade Part II" above n27, 119. 
328 Hedley Byrne & Partners & Co v Heller & Partners Ltd l1964] AC 465. 
329 Tlte Law of Torts above n3, 259. 
330 The Law of Torts above n3, 262. 
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uncertain, although development in Canada may help New Zealand.331 
Relational loss may be recovered however under unlawful interference and 
provide a more certain outcome for the plaintiff. Relational interests can be 
of great value. 
Pure financial loss may be recoverable but only if all relevant policy 
considerations on balance support liability.332 The primary matter of policy 
which arises simply out of the fact that a person has suffered pure financial 
loss is the fear of indeterminate liability .333 This is where negligence causes 
problems for potential plaintiffs. Anyone incidentally and foreseeably 
harmed by unlawful acts could bring a claim.334 The fear of indeterminate 
liability works against the victims of intentional unlawful interference 
using negligence instead. The class of plaintiffs could be very large if 
intention to harm the plaintiff and unlawful means were not required. 
That is why unlawful interference can provide a better avenue for plaintiff's 
that can satisfy the test requirements. 
Significant advances would still need to be made to make negligence more 
attractive and unlawful interference totally redundant. Although the 
narrower the tort, the less indeterminate but also the less useful it will be to 
most plaintiffs. Perhaps negligence will be the only avenue for many. 
VII CONCLUSION 
Both torts seem to conform to the antiquity paradox. This paradox seems 
key to the introduction of new torts. However, the tort paradox seems less 
important in New Zealand, provided the tort introducing the new one is 
well established. The agency paradox is important because it is linked to the 
antiquity paradox, privacy and unlawful interference conform to about the 
same degree. While these factors may help introduce new torts they do not 
331 See Canadian National Railways v Norsk Pacific Steamship Co (1992) 91 DLR (4th) 289; 
H 11sky Oil v Saint Jolin Ship Building Ltd (18 December 1997) unreported No 2, 4855. 
332 The Law of Torts above n3, 269-70. 
333 The Law of Torts above n3, 270. 
334 "Civil Liability for Industrial Action" above n70, 369. 
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explain the greater interest in privacy over unlawful interference. 
It is argued that other factors are required to introduce new torts and that 
these factors better explain privacy's strength. The most important factors 
are society's expectations and necessity. 
The courts should have a dynamic role. It would be wrong if the courts 
were powerless to extend the common law to remedy wrongs made possible 
by progress or resulting from new social or commercial conditions.335 
However, some legitimisation is required, the antiquity paradox is also 
important for this reason. Torts may succeed because they come at the right 
time. 
The current social climate is particularly important, as it should be if we 
want a common law that reflects our current values. The common law 
should respond to society's needs. Judicial intervention may also be easier 
to justify regarding human rights. International covenants witness society's 
expectations. Privacy has a higher profile due to the current interest in 
human rights. 
On the other hand, there is a move away from protecting businesses. Also, 
unlawful interference is an economic right, not a human right. Unlawful 
interference arguably does not have the same connotations or support as 
privacy. Economic interests may be considered less fundamental. 
Necessity is another key feature that explains why privacy was introduced 
and has been more successful than unlawful interference. Modern 
technology and the media are becoming more invasive. It is easy to intrude 
on individuals' privacy and the tools to do so are readily available. Privacy 
seems necessary, whereas unlawful interference may be useful but arguably 
there are few cases falling through the gaps. In most cases other causes of 
action exist, although unlawful interference may place the economic torts 
on a more logical foundation. 
335 Roberson above n268, 449. 
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The parties involved may influence the courts in deciding whether to create 
new actions. A deserving plaintiff the court can identify with is probably 
more likely to succeed. However, this is undesirable. The courts should 
look instead at society's interests as a whole. 
The fact that judges can identify with a desire for privacy and that it is 
potentially available to anyone helps to explain privacy's appeal. Unlawful 
interference does not have the same universality. 
An inability to protect the interest under negligence encourages the courts to 
introduce new torts. Policy reasons may require a separate intentional tort. 
Unlawful means and intention seem ways to strike a balance between no 
liability and indeterminate liability for economic loss. The common law 
dislikes protecting 'feelings' without physical injury, therefore intention 
may be required for privacy. Conduct is more offensive when intentional 
rather than merely negligent, therefore privacy should be an intentional 
tort. There are persuasive reasons for keeping the requirement of intention 
in both torts. Although eventually the torts may be absorbed by negligence. 
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